PROMOTING SECURITY AND THE FEELING OF SECURITY VIS À VIS THIRD-PARTY VIOLENCE IN THE EUROPEAN RAIL SECTOR

A good practice guide
IMPRINT

This project was initiated and accompanied by the European sectoral social dialogue rail. It was organised by EVA European Academy for Environmentally Friendly Transport.

The European social partners

Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies (CER)
Avenue des Arts, 53
1000 Bruxelles
Belgium
Telephone: +32 2 2130870
e-mail: contact@cer.be
www.cer.be

European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF)
Galerie AGORA
Rue du Marché aux Herbes 105, Boîte 11
1000 Brüssel
Belgium
Telephone: +32 2 2854660
e-mail: etf@etf-europe.org
www.etf-europe.org

Editor and project organisation

EVA – European Academy for Environmentally Friendly Transport gGmbH
Boyenstraße 46
10115 Berlin
Germany
Telephone: +49 30 3087526
e-mail: info@eva-akademie.de
www.eva-akademie.de
Insecurity and the feeling of insecurity in public transport and in particular in rail passenger transport is a serious work related and societal problem, that is on the agenda of the social partners in the rail sector since many years. Threats, rude behaviour as well as verbal and physical attacks against railway workers are worryingly increasing. The figures are alarming. That what the social partners call third party violence is not an occasional phenomena but daily reality for many railway workers. Media and public awareness is rising, when spectacular cases are reported but there is not sufficient attention paid to the daily violence.

Daily violence must not be underestimated. For the workers concerned this insecurity and feeling of insecurity can cause serious health problems up to incapacity to work or long lasting mental illnesses. This is why the European social partners of the rail sector developed a joint project on “Insecurity and the feeling of insecurity in rail passenger transport” in order to prevent, manage and reduce insecurity and the feeling of insecurity caused by third party violence. Their aim was to improve the personal security of workers and with it, the one of passengers.

Violence is a problem not only for railway workers; it also causes high costs for the railway companies and for the public. Costs generated by absenteeism and illnesses, medical costs and, in the extreme, pension costs for workers not being able to do their job any more. Not forgetting the damage of the image of the rail companies and public transport in general.

There is consensus among the European social partners that successful measures against violence require joint actions and joint strategies of all parties involved including politicians, civil society, police and justice at local, national and European level. The European social partners support a zero tolerance policy involving all societal forces.

It is an intrinsic interest of employers and their duty to guarantee a safe and healthy work environment for their employees. But also politics has the duty to contribute fighting against the phenomena of violence in the public space. Everybody has the right to live in a society that guarantees security, because it is one of the conditions for the full expression of the freedom of every person. In this sense security is fundamental both for the individuals but also from a collective point of view, since it is a prerequisite for a sound development of the society as a whole.

At European level, besides promoting the exchange of information and experiences, the social partners tried to mobilize all social forces and public transport companies through the adoption of instruments which allow a clear identification of the nature of the problem and seek solutions for improving the feeling of security of employees and passengers, the people most exposed to the risk of aggression and violence.

The European social partners promote the adoption of preventive measures that make response to acts of violence committed on railway staff and passengers taking all the necessary policies in order to reduce the widespread feeling of insecurity in the public transport sector with a shared common approach.

FOREWORD

Jean-Paul Preumont
CER Social Affairs

Sabine Trier
ETF Deputy Secretary General
Zero tolerance of violence against rail employees at work – this is the goal the European social partners in the rail sector, the European Transport Worker’s Federation (ETF) and the Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies (CER), have set themselves. Even if rail passenger transport can be considered generally safe, cases of third-party violence and aggression cause damage for rail companies and their employees. Cases of violence always have negative effects on employees, companies and customers/users. Surveys of rail employees continue to show that many of them have already found themselves subject to either verbal or physical attacks.1

The European social partners and their member organisations (companies and unions) consider that intensive social and public dialogue help to tackle the problem. The first measures were taken by the European social partners in the public transport sector ETF and UITP. They entrusted an expert working group in 2003 with analyzing the security situation in public passenger transport. In a study funded by the European Union, the set of problems was analysed, leading to the publication of joint recommendations for the sector.2 The social partner in the railway sector CER joined these recommendations. In 2011 the European social partners in the railway sector ETF and CER commissioned a survey, which looked into the implementation of the recommendations in the different member states. The results show that major progress has been made in counteracting the problem, especially in the field of prevention and aftercare. Nevertheless, 70% of survey participants state that aggression against rail employees has increased over the last few years.3

The focus of this EU-funded project, in which the two social partners ETF and CER are involved, is on third-party violence against rail employees at work. It does not focus on harassment at work by colleagues (i.e., bullying or mobbing) and neither on acts of terrorism, as it requires a different approach.

Examples of good practices implemented in European companies (not necessarily belonging to the rail sector) are intended to support all involved persons in developing new ideas and implementing solutions proven to be effective elsewhere. The joint recommendations of the social partners point to fields of action where measures are seen as reasonable. The recommendations also underline the necessity of both sides working together to ensure that the measures are implemented effectively.

Definitions
In the project at hand, we are looking at the insecurity of rail employees caused by third-party violence. First of all, this requires a definition of certain terms and a distinction between various forms of violence and insecurity.

Security and safety
This project looks at the security of employees working in the field of rail passenger transport. Security is a topic with many different aspects and risk factors. The English language distinguishes the terms “safety” and “security”. The differences are not easily to be seen. The tradition of the term “safety” is the protection from accidents and the tradition of the term “security” is where people act deliberately to gain profit or create harm.4 In this document we use of the term security instead of safety to distinguish between protection against threats and protection against hazards. Though third-party violence endangers personal safety, we underline with the term security our focus on third-party violence as malicious acts in contrast to accidents.5

“Security” constitutes a condition without threats, the absence of damage or danger. However such a condition is never 100%, as unforeseen events can always occur. Security does not therefore mean that security risks can be totally excluded, but that they are unlikely to happen. Objective security can be defined as the number of incidents taking place within a defined period of time. Subjective security is dependent on several factors influencing the experience and opinion of an individual and possibly resulting in a feeling of insecurity.

Insecurity and the feeling of insecurity
Insecurity is understood as the opposite of security, i.e., a situation potentially dangerous to a person’s health or dignity. A feeling of insecurity arises on account of subjective aspects, in situations where certain incidents or occurrences are expected. Such expectations are based on personal experience or on reports by people who have found themselves in similar circumstances, for instance in a similar place, or in a situation involving a comparable person or occurring at a similar time of day. Such reports may for instance have been spread by the media. Press reports on an act of violence in public transport make people using the same form of transport, or who are at a similar place at a similar time, feel unsafe.

The feeling of insecurity is much lower when unforeseen incidents can to a great extent be ruled out. Different factors increase or decrease the feeling of insecurity in public passenger transport. Negative factors are darkness, groups showing uncivil behaviour, lonely places, problems with the expected service, etc. The feeling of insecurity is mainly based on personal experience or that of other people.

---

1 Rheinische Post, 9.11.2012
3 CER, ETF: Insecurity and the feeling of insecurity in public transport. The implementation of the European social partners’ Joint Recommendations signed by ETF, UITP, IUU and supported by CER and CEEP on November 13th 2003. Brussels 2010
4 Erling Albrechtsen: Security vs safety. NTNU Trondheim, August 2003
Third-party violence and harassment at work
This project looks specifically into the situation of rail employees at work. OSHA, the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, defines workplace violence as “Incidents where staff are abused, threatened or assaulted in circumstances related to their work, including commuting to and from work, involving an explicit or implicit challenge to their safety, well-being and health.”

We distinguish here between external and internal incidents, with the former referring to third-party violence and the latter to harassment at work.

Insecurity and the feeling of insecurity result from situations where there is a threat or expectation of violence through a third party. Violence is intentional, not accidental. The term “third-party violence” refers both to physical and verbal attacks, or to the threat of physical violence. Third-party violence can be defined as “Insults, threats or physical or psychological aggression exerted by people from outside the organisation, including customers and clients, against a person at work that endangers their health, safety and well-being. Aggressive or violent acts take the form of uncivil behaviour; lack of respect for others, physical or verbal aggression; intention to injure and/or assault; intention to harm the other person”.

All types of aggression with demeaning, insulting or damaging effects on the victim’s dignity or health are meant here. The aggressor is an external person, a customer or a passenger using the company’s facilities or services, but not a colleague or manager from the company the victim works for. This differs from harassment at work, a term applying to repeated and inappropriate assaults by a colleague or group of colleagues working for the same company with the intention of harassing, demeaning or threatening the victim.

With the project focusing on incidents directed against rail employees and with consequences for the employees themselves and for the company they work for, it involves both social partners.

A comparison of the security situation in different European countries
Figures on violence against employees come from the 2010 European Working Conditions Survey, though no distinction is made here between third-party violence and harassment at work. The questions were answered by employees from 16 sectors in the EU27 countries, Norway, Croatia, Turkey, FYR Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and Kosovo. The cross-sector questions asked were:

Have you been subjected to physical violence at work in the past year?

http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/surveys/smt/ewcs/ewcs2010_13_05.htm
Have you been subjected to threats and humiliating behaviour at work in the last month?


Have you been subjected to verbal abuse at work in the last month?

http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/surveys/smt/ewcs/ewcs2010_13_03.htm
In all sectors, reported incidents of violence were higher in the Northern European countries than in the Southern European ones. Looking specifically at the rail sector, these are also the countries reporting an increase in the number of assaults, whether physical attacks, verbal assaults, threats or insults. Figures pertaining just to the rail sector are not available in this depth for the whole of Europe. Although 12 unions from 11 countries and 16 companies from 14 countries took part in a 2010 survey organised by the social partners, figures are incomplete and not representative. What the survey does however reveal are certain trends, corroborated by an EU-OSHA focal point survey in the field of safety and health at work in the EU Member States. Awareness for the problem of violence at work varies greatly from country to country, though one cross-sector finding is that awareness of the risks involved is much higher in certain countries (the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom) than in others. In the New Member States, acknowledgment of the relevance of the problem leaves a lot to be desired, and there is much less statistical information available on them.

Table 1: Is the level of acknowledgement of third-party violence appropriate in the country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU-15</th>
<th>EU-10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of the reasons for the lack of information are that the problem is not acknowledged as such, that no great priority is attached to the subject, or that there are only limited procedures and instruments (or none at all) for dealing with the subject. Of the 22 countries surveyed, 15 have an official definition of the term “third-party violence”, and 21 of the term “workplace harassment”.

When comparing the statistics, we therefore need to take different aspects into account:
- There are cultural differences in the way situations involving violence are dealt with;
- Interpretations differ on where violence and aggression start and what incidents rank as being violent or aggressive;
- Statutory provisions differ;
- Reporting systems differ from one country to the other, and some companies in certain countries do not even have reporting systems;
- Verbal assaults and insults are often not reported at all.

The project workshops also revealed major differences in the progress achieved by the companies in terms of dealing with violence against rail employees. This means that it is virtually impossible to compare figures. Important for all countries is the fact, that employees and management are made aware of third-party violence on national and company level, and that information on the situation in their company is made available. As the survey shows that especially the intensity of incidents has increased across all considered countries, companies need appropriate instruments and methods in the fields of prevention, intervention and aftercare.

Risk factors

Violence in public spaces is a phenomenon that cannot be completely prevented, despite all measures taken by a company. Although an overall increase in incidents of violence cannot be observed in Europe, it is their intensity that is on the rise. The reports from the company and union representatives taking part in this project show that an increasing proportion of the population has a reduced awareness of what constitutes good behaviour in public and towards fellow citizens. In this respect, moral attitudes have changed for the worse. A higher level of violence in a society is generally reflected in all areas. Insecure social ties contribute to a inclination towards violence and deficient economic circumstances have the potential to promote aggression.

Public spaces are often the scene of uncivil behaviour, especially by groups of young people, as the chances of being punished or having to bear the consequences of their behaviour are low. A further problem in several countries is the reporting of incidents. As it is assumed that the report will have no consequences for the culprit(s), enforcement employees see no use in making a report. In fact, the opposite is often true, with employees afraid that a report could have negative consequences for themselves. It must therefore be assumed that there are a high number of unreported cases. Compared with other sectors, the transport sector is characterised by anonymity.

The rail employees most often subject to third-party violence are security staff, train conductors and drivers. Therefore, a risk assessment of these workplaces should be carried out in all companies. By doing so, possible causes could be analysed, weak spots could be identified and solutions could be elaborated. Assaults can have structural or technical causes, or be dependent on the situation or the individual circumstances of the culprit.
Structural and technical factors
The security of a workplace is influenced by a range of factors. Both work organisation (working environment and tasks) and technical arrangements play a role in determining staff security. Risk factors are:

- Work in contact with the public
- Working with cash, often in connection with ticket inspection and people travelling without a valid ticket
- No security staff
- No standards for punishing assaults
- Lonely or empty stations
- Working alone
- Working in the evening, at night or at weekends
- Technical problems: too hot/too cold
- Overcrowded trains
- Work organisation reasons, for instance frustrations due to delays
- The anonymity of public transport
- The lack of consequences for acts of violence
- Street culture/group behaviour

Individual factors
Individual factors also have an influence on how acts of violence come about. These can involve socio-demographic factors, personal characteristics and specific behaviour. Looking specifically at public transport, the factors most often observed are:

- A general inclination towards conflict and/or violence as an acquired pattern for solving conflicts A low level of frustration tolerance
- Communication problems and language barriers
- Attitudes and values, cultural background
- Passenger behaviour in connection with mass events (especially football matches)
- No fear of punishment
- Alcohol and drugs
- Mentally handicapped people
- The characteristics of certain unruly groups – there is often a problem here to inspect tickets
- Low awareness of moral standards
- Trespassing
- Vandalism
- Stress
- Aggression against people in uniform

Consequences for staff
The consequences of third-party violence for rail employees can be of physical or psychological nature.

Physical consequences:
- Different degrees of injuries and even death

Psychological consequences:
The psychological consequences are dependent on how individuals rate incidents. Possible reactions are:

- Fear
- A feeling of insecurity
- Post-traumatic stress, difficulties concentrating and reduced self-confidence
- A decrease in work satisfaction
- Absenteeism
- Avoidance behaviour
- Fear of punishment
- Quitting one's job

Consequences for companies

- Train delays and cancellations
- Negative image
- More staff off sick
- Higher insurance premiums
- Lower productivity of the employees concerned
- High “lost-time” costs

Violent incidents thus result in financial losses for companies.
**Methodology used in the project**

The European social partners intend to reduce and prevent insecurity in rail passenger transport caused by third-party violence. Although earlier projects in the rail passenger transport sector have already dealt with the subject, there has been no support in terms of information material for involved parties in the European rail passenger transport. This supporting information material was now developed in the context of this project.

The focus of the project group’s work was on defining prevention, intervention and aftercare measures for dealing with third-party violence and promoting staff security in the rail sector. With both social partners working together, the idea was to analyse the feasibility and benefit of the measures. This joint approach promised to guarantee the greatest possible success for the envisaged measures.

The project targeted different goals and produced a range of results:

- **A comparison of the situations in individual countries**
  Participants presented the situation in their respective countries regarding rail employees, discussing problems and consequences, and assessing them individually. These presentations revealed that awareness for third-party violence differs greatly from country to country, hence resulting in different ways of tackling the issue.

- **Identification of Good practices**
  One focus of the project group’s work was to identify examples of Good practices with the potential of being transferred and implemented in other countries and other companies. We define Good practices as measures with measurable targets, with a sustainable concept and sustainable consequences, offering an innovative approach and contributing to solving the problems at hand.
  We started by identifying subject areas in which measures were seen to be needed: security strategies and technical resources, HR policy, social dialogue and PR work. In all areas, country activities contributing to solving the problems already existed. These are to be found in the “Good practices” chapter.

- **Joint recommendations of the European rail sector social partners**
  The “joint recommendations” refer to statements of the social partners on ways of dealing with the problems of third-party violence against rail employees. They contain background information and define the intentions, objectives and recommendations for action of the social partners. The recommendations for action relate to the following:
  - Creating and raising awareness
  - Setting up a special centre
  - Documentation, reporting and analysis
  - Security management and technical measures
  - Preventive training and raising staff awareness
  - Aftercare
  - Law and order partnerships
  - Implementation of Good practice examples
  - Dialogue with politicians, other stakeholders and the social partners (civil and social dialogue)
  - Conditions under which public rail passenger transport contracts are awarded
  - Conclusion of a social partner agreement
  - Regular evaluation of the effectiveness of the measures
  The full text of the joint recommendations is to be found in the next chapter.

- **Raising awareness for the problem**
  One of the project’s aims was to raise awareness and generate understanding for the problem among employers and employees. Therefore, company representatives and unions regularly reported on the current project activities.

- **Social partner agreements at national and company level**
  An important tool for implementing measures for overcoming the problem of third-party violence against rail employees is the conclusion and implementation of social partner agreements. The project participants of the working groups elaborated important ideas on ways of implementing collective agreements.
  The first question was whether collective agreements were to be at national or company level. The working groups came to the conclusion here that activities were needed at different levels.

- **Policy and legislation at European, national and local level**
  - More effective regulation is needed in society
  - A minimum standard with regard to security needs to be included in public tenders (e.g. training and numbers of staff)
  - A ban on alcohol in trains

- **Societal level**
  - Raising public awareness for the subject and coming up with a clear definition of third-party violence
  - Improving overall conditions for showing moral courage
  - Public education programmes naming the problems and teaching ways of dealing with them
The level of social partner agreements
Agreements need to be concluded:
• at local level in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity
• and/or at company level
• and/or at sectoral level
• and at European level

Content of social partner agreements
• Preventive measures
• De-escalation training for staff in the areas concerned
• Providing staff with security equipment
• Sufficient staff in areas where problems can be expected
• Appropriate activities at company level
• Proper reporting (standardised definition of reporting requirements)
• Close cooperation with the police (in accordance with statutory conditions)
• Good PR
• Aftercare measures

In many countries strategies and measures already exist, to be taken when the security of rail employees is at stake. Written collective agreements remain the exception (Germany, France). Certain companies have implemented voluntary agreements (the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg), or verbal agreements have been reached (Austria). Most countries have an officer responsible for health and safety at work. Details on security are sometimes published in annual reports (Sweden, Bulgaria).

How can we achieve the goal?
Joint social partner action is needed to improve the situation. The agreements would apply either to the whole sector or to individual companies. The agreements should cover public transport as a whole.

At company level, participants recommend the following steps:
• A clear definition of what constitutes violence and what can be done against it (e.g. definition of terms used, statements condemning violence and proclaiming support for employee victims, creating awareness, reporting systems, etc.).
• Making sure adequate working conditions exist (e.g. full-staffed shifts, training, equipment, fast communication facilities, mobile phones in trains, risk assessments).
• Effective aftercare (e.g. financial support/security, medical aftercare, legal support, the opportunity to switch jobs for a short period, protection against dismissal, a centre responsible for dealing with such cases).
• Prevention measures (e.g. law and order partnerships, cooperation projects (football clubs), training measures, PR work)
• Evaluation (e.g. at sector/company/location/employee level), PR, consequences for management)
• Suggestion schemes (e.g. allowing employees to submit suggestions, awarding prizes for good suggestions)

The following unions and companies took part in the project as partners:

ETF
AUSTRIA: vida
BELGIUM: ACOD/CSP Spoor
BULGARIA: Federation of Transport Trade Unions in Bulgaria (FTTUB)
FRANCE: Fédération Générale des Transports et de L’Équipement CFDT – Union Fédérale des Chemins et Activités Complémentaires (FGTE-CFDT UFCAC)
GERMANY: Eisenbahn- und Verkehrsgewerkschaft (EVG) and European Works Council Deutsche Bahn AG
HUNGARY: Vasúti Dolgozók Szabad Szakszervezete – Free Trade Union of Railway Workers (VDSzSz)
CER
CER: Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies (CER)
BELGIUM: Corporate security Service, SNCF-Holding
GERMANY: Deutsche Bahn AG
ITALY: Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane (FS)
FRANCE: Société nationale des chemins de fer Français (SNCF)
BULGARIA: BDZ – Passengers EOOD
Promoting security and the feeling of security vis-à-vis third-party violence in the European railway sector

Recommendations of the European railway sector social partners

1. BACKGROUND OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOCIAL PARTNERS

The security of railway employees and passengers is of essential importance for the European social partners and their affiliated companies and trade unions. Although rail passenger transport is basically safe, the social partners are very concerned in particular about third-party violence against employees in rail passenger transport. We define third-party violence as “Incidents where staff are insulted, threatened or assaulted in circumstances related to their work, involving an explicit or implicit challenge to their safety, well-being and health”1. Incidents of third-party violence have a physical, social and economic impact for the employees and the social partners. These might be physical injuries, mental distress, fear and the feeling of insecurity, absenteeism and avoidance behaviour, lost working days and sick leave, termination of the job, disability pensions for the employees, a negative image of the service provider due to delays and cancellation of trains and other consequences. The duty to protect the health and safety of employees while at work lies with employers under both EU and national legislations.2 But employees also shall behave as far as possible in such a way that their own health and safety is not impaired. The European social partners aim at a cooperative corporate culture for taking measures to prevent violence and to deal with the consequences caused by third-party violence, especially against railway company employees. The European social partners emphasise, that a joint approach promises to be the most successful.

---

In issuing these joint recommendations, the European railway sector social partners have the following intentions:

• To support their members – affiliated unions and companies – in taking measures that help to increase security and the feeling of security of staff and passengers vis-à-vis third-party violence;

• To contribute to improving working conditions in rail passenger transport;

• To initiate strategies aimed at preventing and handling third-party violence at work via practical measures in its communication, prevention, intervention and aftercare.

2. OBJECTIVES OF THE JOINT RECOMMENDATIONS

3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION FOR THE SOCIAL PARTNERS

Measures aimed at communication, prevention, intervention and aftercare should to be tailored to the respective fields of work and company divisions. A global and joint approach is deemed to be the most promising here. Therefore, the European social partners recommend that a sustainable policy should be applied, which includes measures in the following areas:

• Creating awareness

Third-party violence can be reduced through raising awareness of this issue among employers, employees, customers and passengers. Therefore, the social partners on company or industry sector level should aim at a joint approach to tackle the problem. They should define a joint communication and prevention strategy, which includes a “zero tolerance” campaign, which contains appropriate guidance and training for the employees, preventive measures for the public along with a description of incidents needing to be reported. These descriptions should be formulated in a way suitable for classifying acts of violence in a computer database.

• Establishing a specialised entity

An entity should be established within the companies, with the official task of analysing and implementing the agreed measures. In any case the designated entity should cooperate closely with the security and personnel units and the affected business units. Within the scope of applicable law and possible adequate means, incidents of third-party violence should be recorded and examined using appropriate means. This entity can also be the contact point in the case of incidents or questions.

• Reporting, recording and analysing

All incidents clearly defined as needing to be reported (including insults and threats), should be recorded in an appropriate systematic way and assessed. Requisite measures may be designed and implemented. All those involved should be informed about the process. Employees should be encouraged to report all incidents and to suggest improvement measures if possible. A European typology of incidents, which have to be reported, would help to harmonise the understanding of third-party violence on European level and should be established.

• Security management and technical means

Security management combines personnel and technical measures. A very important factor is to make available on trains and in stations active and present security personnel, specially trained for the railway, as well as, depending on the countries, the presence of the police. Preventive measures can also be specific procedures and/or facilities concerning ticket sales, access to trains, construction aspects of stations, video surveillance etc. Video surveillance systems can help to prevent, to identify and so to prosecute incidents and crimes.
• Preventive training and sensibilisation for staff members
Training prepares employees with possible customer contact and the respective management for third-party violence situations and teaches ways of prevention and of handling the consequences in the best way. Companies should provide appropriate training courses for these employees and their management on all necessary topics, including de-escalation, recognising potentially violent situations, etc.

• Aftercare
Appropriate and transparent procedures on support should be provided to employees who are victims of third-party violence, which, depending on the circumstances, could involve medical (including psychological), legal, practical, and/or financial support.

• Law and order partnerships
Cooperation between rail companies, the police and the authorities improves the overall ability to enforce security. The social partners also highlight the importance of working with other appropriate partners at national or local level to identify and prevent third-party violence by having a consistent approach.

• Using good practices
Good practices already exist with regard to the prevention, handling and aftercare of third-party violence against railway company employees in Europe. The measures foreseen need to take into account the size and type of company and their application should be validated. Good practices described in the guide “Promoting security and the feeling of security vis-à-vis third-party violence in the European railway sector. A good practice guide” can be used here.1

• Dialogue with politicians, further stakeholders and with social partners / civil and social dialogue
The demands of the rail companies, the employee representatives and the trade unions on politicians and possible other involved stakeholders should be brought to the attention of national and European politicians.

• Awarding of public contracts for rail passenger transport
The awarding of public contracts for rail passenger transport should require the submission of a section on the security of employees and passengers, which should be considered in the process of awarding the contract.

• Conclusion of a social partner agreement
Concluding social partner agreements is deemed worthwhile on different levels (company and / or industry sector level, etc.). Suggestions put forward by employees for improving weak points in security at work should be examined, and, where feasible, taken up.

• Regular assessment of the effectiveness of the measures taken
The European social partners recommend regular assessment of the measures taken on European and national level (e.g. annually). Experience, related developments in legislation and technology should also be to be taken into account to provide better solutions. Results should be assessed and agreement reached on ways of improving the measures. Assessment results can be taken up in new agreements.

Promoting security and the feeling of security vis-à-vis third-party violence in the European railway sector

Recommendations of the European railway sector social partners

signed in Brussels on 5 December 2012
Deutsche Bahn AG
Germany

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
Security is a valuable asset and is one of the most basic needs of our customers and employees. Security means reliability, certainty and protection against risks. This is especially important in a company like Deutsche Bahn, as we bear enormous responsibility for vast numbers of people and huge quantities of freight, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. We are responsible for two billion rail passengers per annum, 290,000 employees and the carriage of 70 million shipments overland to their destination every year. Security is therefore an integral part of our mission statement, of the quality we promise our customers. And we keep that promise: with the help of a professional security organisation, with the help of well-trained employees, sophisticated technical security concepts and close cooperation with the police and the competent authorities.

Description of the initiative:
There is one central unit, Corporate Security, which attends to all Group-wide strategic and conceptual security tasks, and another unit which converts the theoretical directives into practical operations and ensures security at local level. That second unit refers to the DB subsidiary, DB Sicherheit/DB Security, whose employees can be identified by their blue uniforms. They create the first impression of DB and are simultaneously the first point of contact for customers on board our trains and buses and at stations in Germany.

Implementation in the company:
Deutsche Bahn is a transport company which operates on a global scale. Security is a central factor for the Group’s economic success. Security therefore calls for cooperation across all divisions of the DB Group and with its external partners. Corporate Security has overall responsibility for this key subject and has a workforce of more than 100 employees in seven different work areas. The following chapters outline the different sections and their remits.

Security coordination and principles (CZS): This is the place where all corporate security strategies and concepts are coordinated. The team coordinates all national and international corporate security networks, thus ensuring standard security structures and norms throughout the world.

DB command and control centre and global crisis management (CZL): The DB command and control centre represents the operative part of the DB’s permanent security monitoring. It includes the following functions: a 24/7 service, international crisis management, and monitoring.
Success factors – results – evaluation, comments: Managing safety – cooperation with the DB Divisions: Corporate Security works closely with the management of all DB Divisions, providing advice, information and support to the divisional security managers on the implementation of corporate security guidelines. In doing so, they take into account the specific requirements of their divisions. The security managers are also involved in drawing up regional security concepts.

Reliable partners – collaboration with the Federal Police: Since 1 December 2000 the DB AG has been working together with the Federal Police under a law and order partnership agreement. Over the last 10 years they have extended their conceptual cooperation at national and regional levels and intensified their exchange of information. The partnership focuses on joint patrols, joint presence at major events and preventive measures such as awareness campaigns on specific topics.

Worldwide security – the networking principle: As a global provider of mobility and logistics services, it goes without saying that the DB’s security strategies need to be globally networked. The core topic here is to continue extending the corporate network at an international level.

Joint responsibility – the Rail Security Conference: The Rail Security Conference takes place once a year in the DB Academy at Potsdam’s Kaiserbahnhof, High-ranking specialists and managers from the security authorities at Federal level and from the German states (Bundesländer) take part, along with representatives from companies, the rail sector and other institutions. The basic idea behind this exchange of views is that public transport security problems can only be overcome through joint action involving all stakeholders. The Federal Police and the Deutsche Bahn incorporate the results of these conferences into their security operations.

Greater public attention – the role of prevention The fight against vandalism and violence is an issue affecting society as a whole. The DB does its share of supporting this fight, defining targets and implementing strategies together with its partners at Federal and local level. PR campaigns spotlighting citizens play a major role here, with posters and flyers encouraging people to show more moral courage, giving hints on how to behave in threatening situations and warning people against pickpockets and luggage theft.

Contact Person:
Deutsche Bahn AG
Corporate Security
Security Coordination and Principles
Armin Kindler
Potsdamer Platz 2
10785 Berlin
Telephone: +49 30 29761464
e-mail: armin.kindler@deutschebahn.com
SECURITY CONCEPT SNCF

SNCF
FRANCE

1 Context
The SNCF operates in an open environment. Because of this the SNCF’s activities, its clients, its assets and its railway operations risk becoming the target of malicious acts. Trains, stations and their surroundings, and generally all areas open to the public, are places where one may find all types of social- and anti-social- behaviour. The menace covers the whole spectrum of violence from simple verbal incivility to terrorist acts.

These sorts of acts not only favour an overall sentiment of insecurity, they also constitute a real risk for railway operation causing production problems both directly and indirectly: late arrival for our passengers and damage to railway property, the latter frequently entailing supplementary costs and delay for repairs which may be of considerable importance.

For all these reasons, security is a major preoccupation for the SNCF which strives continuously to maintain a security policy which involves everyone in the company.

2 Role of SNCF internal security service staff
The work of the SNCF internal security service is regulated by French law in the form of the “Code des Transports”. This law specifies the services’ missions and the legal framework in which it operates. Railway security service personnel (SUgE) ensure the security of property and people and protect staff and company assets; they work to ensure a sense of security for everyone when on railway premises. Everyday more than 2700 armed, uniformed and authorised officers dedicated to crime prevention reassure both the general public and railway staff through their visible presence on the ground. They work proactively with the police and the Gendarmerie to improve the responsiveness and effectiveness of their interventions, which may also take the form of joint operations. This cooperation helps to ensure the overall coherence of security and crime prevention policy.

3 Organisation of the SNCF internal security service
SNCF security policy is aimed at both maintaining customer confidence and protecting the efficacy of railway operations. The SNCF security directorate’s functions consist of risk analysis, determining and managing the application of security measures throughout the company, developing expertise in civil defence and protection of railway property and management of the everyday operations of SNCF security personnel.

SNCF security policy is based on 8 priorities:
- Development and reinforcement of relations between the security department and other departments of the company. For this reason over 450 security liaison officers have been nominated throughout all sectors of the organisation.
- Application of government directives and decisions. The SNCF determines and sets up working procedures that are then applied throughout the organisation.
- Professionalization of security stakeholders via the “Security University”
- Consolidation and professionalization of working relationships with external partners and stakeholders.
- Reinforcement of crime prevention and development of a feeling of security amongst our customers and staff. The SNCF makes sure its staff and customers are fully aware of its work in crime prevention and of the resources deployed, which helps to reinforce the idea that “we are looking after you”.
- Continuation of ongoing work in the fight against metal theft.
- Protection of the company’s economic interests and protection of its industrial knowhow.
- Prevention of antisocial behaviour

At local level, the security directorate works through 11 security zones, each of which is responsible for applying national security policy and for ensuring effective coordination with local stakeholders.

A central operational coordination unit works for the prevention and anticipation of malicious acts. Through a dedicated internal emergency telephone number (19) all SNCF staff have permanent access to the National Security Command and Control Centre (PCNS – Poste de Commandement National de Sureté). Through its “hotline” to the Police and Gendarmerie and to railway signalling and traffic management centres, the “PCNS” can order and coordinate reactive security interventions. It also looks after the running of audio and video security monitoring posts.

The SNCF has also set up an emergency phone number for its passengers (3117) which may be used in case of illness or danger on board trains.
4 Effective partnerships

- The SNCF security directorate participates actively in the analysis of security phenomena which have an impact on the company and in the definition and development of national policy on transport security. This is done through partnerships with state and local stakeholders. In this context, SNCF personnel participate in 300 local and intercommunal councils for security and delinquency prevention.

- Through its partnership with the national education department, the SNCF works in schools to explain and increase awareness among young people that railway stations and trains are unlike other places which are open to the public.

- Partnerships and exchanges have also been established between the SNCF and public authorities. For example a police commissioner, an officer from the Gendarmerie Nationale and a magistrate have all been seconded to the SNCF. In exchange, three railway security personnel have been seconded to the Public Transport Security Unit, the headquarters of the Gendarmerie Nationale, and to the regional directorate of the Paris transport police.

- The SNCF regularly organises and participates in exercises with its security partners in order to prepare itself for action in case of a major security alert. In the same way it also works closely with stakeholders in the preparation of major events (international sports competitions, major national cultural events...) in order to ensure coherence between its internal arrangements and dispositions and those of state authorities.

5 Visible results of our actions

Given the rapid evolution of anti social phenomena, the SNCF must constantly adapt its organisation in order to protect its property, stem violent trends and guarantee the serenity of its staff and customers. More and better technical and human resources are continuously being added to combat pick pocketing, tags and graffiti, metal theft and anti-social behaviour.

With better knowledge, these situations can be more effectively dealt with by our teams on the ground. The effectiveness of targeted operations run jointly with police and Gendarmerie forces is demonstrated by numerous arrests, supply of video footage as evidence (on request by the authorities) followed by successful prosecutions and convictions; all serve to dissuade potential criminals from committing malicious acts. In addition, in recent months a significant reduction in the theft of copper cables (a major cause of disruption to railway operation) provides a clear indication of the effectiveness of combined coordinated operations with the Gendarmerie.

Finally the creation in July 2012 of an “Anti-social behaviour Directorate” demonstrates the company’s desire to address these issues and develop effective solutions. The SNCF seeks to act effectively in order to limit antisocial behaviour and petty crime which are often the precursors to more serious acts of violence.

Contact Person:
François Moreau
Head of Security Coordination
SNCF
39 ter Boulevard de la Chapelle
75010 Paris
France
Telephone: +33 1 40231833
e-mail: francois.moreau@sncf.fr
SBB Switzerland

Attaching top priority to the security of its passengers and staff, the SBB has developed a whole range of measures. The SBB ‘security chain’ is made up of the following components:

Before boarding a train
- Demonstration train (Schulzug), property protection by Securitrans, local police, the RailFair prevention project with its ‘station angels’, prevention assistants and ‘grands frères’, local community projects, station assistance
- Specifically for train crews: hands-on initial and continuing training

While aboard a train
- The RailFair prevention project with its prevention assistants and ‘grands frères’, escorts for schoolchildren, regional and local trains equipped with CCTV, boarding controls, random controls, combined rail/canton police operations at weekends and major events, at-risk trains escorted by Securitas staff and rail police, border controls
- Specifically for train crews: support staff in the Zurich metropolitan area and in the Romandie (train conductors trained by outside experts provide telephone support for colleagues in difficult situations)

After getting off a train
- Customer service, local police
- Specifically for train crews: Training courses, post-incident support from superiors, aftercare through the social network, cases of violence are handled as criminal offences.

Contact Person:
Simon Jungo
Head of Public Safety
Schweizerische Bundesbahnen SBB
Passenger Transport Division
Bollwerk 4
CH-3000 Bern 65
Telephone: +41 51 2204737
e-mail: simon.jungo@sbb.ch
CO-OPERATION WITH EXTERNAL AUTHORITIES
COLLABORATION AGREEMENT WITH LOCAL PARTNERS

SNCF-Holding
Belgium

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
- To ensure the safety of citizens, clients, traders and staff
- Enhancing subjective safety and security and the feeling of security in the vicinity of stations
- Improving the quality of life in the vicinity of stations
- Developing partnerships between the stakeholders

Description of the initiative/activity:
Our target is to achieve an integrated overall approach to crime and public nuisance in and around a station. An integrated overall approach requires collaboration with different partners. The institutional partners, always the same ones for any collaboration agreement in Belgium, sign a “declaration of principle”. Dependent on the type of local problem, further subject-related partners are also involved. The “declaration of principle” is used to shape the form of collaboration, giving it an official framework, listing the conditions, detailing the partners, their points of view and ways they can contribute to the collaboration.

Collaboration takes place in different phases:
- Exchange of information: all partners exchange data on subjective and objective safety and security in and around the station.
- Problem analysis: using this data as a basis, a picture is gained of the security situation inside the station.
- Selecting a plan for maintaining security or for comprehensive action: a plan for maintaining security is selected when there are few problems or just occasional problems. The focus here is on partners exchanging information. When serious structural problems exist in several different fields, the partners opt for a comprehensive action plan. In such a case, collaboration is much more intense and involves several concrete actions.
- Compiling and implementing the plan for maintaining security or for comprehensive action: with the help of photos, the problem points are identified and priorities set. The plan is compiled by the operational partners.
- Evaluation and possible correction of the plan for maintaining security or for comprehensive action: plans are evaluated on a yearly basis, and adjusted where appropriate.

Implementation in the company:
On 2008, the SNCF’s Corporate Security Service recruited 6 criminologists, with each one given responsibility for a certain region. In early 2009, a letter was sent to all towns with a station, inviting them to collaborate with us on security and the quality of life in the vicinity of the station. The response from local partners was overwhelming and we now have collaboration agreements in 170 stations. The Corporate Security Service criminologist is responsible for getting the collaboration up and running. He/she convenes meetings, supervises the execution of the activities and takes care of assessment. Dependent on his own responsibilities and his own specific field, each partner determines in what way he can contribute to improving the quality of life in and around the station.

Success factors – results – evaluation:
The vicinity of a station has been receiving increasing attention over the last few years, as this is the place where people of different ages and cultures come into contact with each other. This development has not escaped the attention of local politicians and their motivation to deal with the problem is high. After 3 years of collaboration between the SNCF’s Corporate Security Service and local partners, this form of collaboration has been given a positive assessment. The positive results can be seen above all in the field of communication:
- The partners know their responsibilities and tasks
- The points of contact for use when problems arise are well-known.
- On account of the objective data exchanged, the partners have a clear picture of the security situation around the station.
- In the case of a problem occurring, intervention can take place quickly.

Contact Person:
Hendrik Vanderkimpen
Head of the Corporate Security Service
SNCB-Holding
Rue de France 52–54
1060 Brussels
e-mail: corporatesecurityservice@b-holding.be
VDSZSZ
Hungary

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
• To keep and raise the level of the feeling of security,
• To assist in aggressive situations on trains and at stations.

Description of the initiative:
Since summer of 2009 the Police Riot Control Department and MAV-START Plc. have an agreement for cooperation. According to the agreement the Department has provided various services as:
• to assist on board personnel,
• to help passengers on board and at stations,
• to assist ticket controllers at stations,
• migrant controls on international trains,
• to assist on ”football fans” trains,
• to assist on trains in summer in Balaton lake (popular target during holidays) area.

Implementation in the company:
The Department has regional offices in seven cities all over the country:
• Budapest,
• Szombathely,
• Gyor,
• Nyírbátor,
• Mickolc,
• Kiskunhalas (2012),
• Pécs (2012).

The Police have camera surveillance at main stations.

The experts of MAV-START Plc. Security Department are in touch with the Police and the officers. In 2011 there were 122 cases when the Police asked the Security Department for help.

Success factors – results – evaluation, comments:
2011 in numbers:
• 53 363 hours duty at stations,
• 583 arrested persons,
• 426 detained persons,
• 148 events,
• 168 persons were handled while police officers were off.

Less thefts on International and on IC trains.

Even more assistance is needed on given trains, more officers and more cameras in the regional offices.

Contact Person:
Katalin Mathe
VDSZSZ
Free Trade Union of Railway Workers
Telephone: +36 70 360 0655
e-mail: mathe.katalin@vdszsz.hu
www.vdszsz.hu
Deutsche Bahn AG
Germany

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
- Increased presence
- Increased effectiveness
- Greater feeling of security
- Greater objective security
- Reduction in crime
- Minimum disruption to operations

Description of the initiative:
Since 1 December 2000 the German railway company DB AG has been working successfully with the Federal Police under a written law and order partnership agreement, aimed at preventing crime and reducing damage through criminal acts. This enhances objective security, while at the same time giving passengers a greater feeling of security. In particular, the presence of coordinated / joint patrols is perceived positively by DB customers.

From an organisational perspective, the law and order partnership is made up of two groups, a coordination group responsible for the strategic collaboration; and working groups dedicated to specific topics. In regular meetings these working groups discuss football problems, prevention, the current status, training, technology, PR measures, operations and fighting crime. The results are passed on to the coordination group in summary form, with the latter responsible for further arrangements and decision-worthy measures.

The DB’s Security Centre in Berlin is the interface between the two partners. The Centre houses the Federal Police’s information centre for rail security and the DB’s command centre. Despite the partnership, the Federal Police’s missions enshrined in legislation, such as rail security, are kept strictly separate from the DB’s security obligations as a company.

Implementation in the company:
The coordination group constitutes the partnership’s top joint decision-making body. Under normal circumstances it meets twice a year, chaired jointly by a Federal Police Vice-President and the head of DB Corporate Security, with the two taking turns to organise, prepare and evaluate the meetings.

The full members of the coordination group come from the Federal Police headquarters, the DB’s Corporate Security department and from DB Sicherheit GmbH (top management). They are selected by their heads of department. Alongside the Interior Ministry’s DB liaison officer, further participants (security managers from different DB divisions, Federal Police officers with specific functions) may also be asked to take part in the meetings to discuss specific topics / events or at regular intervals. Such participation is coordinated by the chairman of the coordination group or may be requested by the departments concerned.

In addition to the regular meetings of the coordination group, where necessary top-level meetings can be arranged between the vice-president of the Federal Police and the head of DB Corporate Security. The coordination group is responsible for defining topics, and for setting up standing or temporary working groups and nominating their respective chairmen. Generally speaking, the working groups are chaired jointly by a representative from the Federal Police and one from the DB AG. The working group chairmen are then responsible for determining the size and composition of their group, how often (generally every two months) and where meetings are to take place, and for reporting back to the coordination group.

Success factors – results – evaluation, comments:
Close cooperation based on mutual trust constitutes the basis of this successful law and order partnership, with both the DB AG and the Federal Police mindful of its objectives. Jointly developed assessment procedures and the “tuning” of individual areas of responsibility have helped make the results / target achievement visible.

Contact Person:
Deutsche Bahn AG
Corporate Security
Security Coordination and Principles
Manfred Renner
Potsdamer Platz 2
10785 Berlin
Telephone: +49 30 29761465
e-mail: manfred.m.renner@deutschebahn.com
CFDT
France

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
How the Sûreté Ferroviaire is organised
Sureté Ferroviaire is the SncF department responsible for ensuring safety and security in stations and trains. Its officials are responsible for prevention, safeguarding people and property, protecting company staff and assets, and making sure that services run smoothly. Their roles cover counselling, security, deterrence, protection and intervention to prevent crime on the railways.
They receive special training, enabling them to intervene in various forms of misdemeanours and disturbance.
They are all sworn, certified and authorised to carry weapons.

Description of the initiative:
The SncF’s Sûreté Ferroviaire employs a 2800-strong security force, spread out across the whole of France, and organised in 11 regional divisions. Their routine work involves safeguarding people and property in trains and stations.

Sûreté Ferroviaire missions include:
Prevention: reducing the frequency of acts against security by working on the causes
Counselling / advisory services: Making use of their safety and security expertise to come up with recommendations
Intervention: reacting to misdemeanours
Protection: Working on consequences and reducing the severity of events.
Sûreté Ferroviaire officials have been given powers to uphold law and order, enforcing compliance with legislation, regulations and government decrees related to the railways.
When at work, they wear uniform and are armed in accordance with the conditions set by legislation. The main legal codes concerned are: the Criminal Code, the Criminal Proceedings Code, the Transport Code, the Government Decree of 22 March 1942 and the Prefectural Decree of 29 June 1977.
Each official takes an initial 6-month training course at the SncF’s national safety centre, the Security University. Throughout their professional career, they take regular upgrade courses, enabling them to maintain their skills at a high level.
The department has its own National Security Command Centre (Poste de Commandement National Sûreté or PCNS). This command centre together with its local offshoots is the first point of contact for security alerts and operational messages concerning safety and security.

The PCNS coordinates the action of different SUGE teams in line with events or requests communicated to it in real-time.
It is in direct contact with the command centres of the police and gendarmerie and can request immediate help from our external partners in case of need.

Implementation in the company:
On its establishment, the SNCF was provided with a surveillance unit. Over time, this developed into the Sûreté Ferroviaire. Its workforce has been slowly but regularly increasing over the last few years, in line with the rise in crime.
The SNCF gives the subject of safety and security high priority in ensuring the smooth functioning of railway operations in France.
To achieve this, specialist units have been introduced over the last three years. Two of the main ones are the EAR, a rapid intervention unit deploying teams to inform and reassure passengers when major crowding or disturbances occur, and the UNIR, a unit made up of officials who can be mobilised throughout France to cope with major events.

Success factors – results – evaluation:
The department makes a significant contribution to reducing the feeling of insecurity in trains and stations, helping to keep down crime and attacks against passengers.
With their ability to defuse (potential) conflicts, its officials have a reassuring effect on staff and customers.

Contact Person:
Delphine Woittez
SNCF Security Division
FGTE-CFDT Cheminots
e-mail: delphine.woittez@sncf.fr
Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS)  
Netherlands

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
This initiative introduces the payment of train tickets by chip card, ending cash payment and paper tickets.

Description of the initiative:
In the Netherlands there are 64 stations secured by gates, mostly stations with security problems and mainly located in big cities. In a few years’ time, access to all stations and trains will only be allowed via chip card. It is an easy way of traveling, with no cash needed to travel by train. The procedure will involve:
• Loading an amount of 20 euro or more onto the chip card.
• Checking in before the journey and checking out at the destination.
• When passengers forget to check out, they will be charged the price of a day ticket. He will be refunded the difference if he can prove, that it was a mistake
• People can reload the chip card using a ticket machine or via their bank accounts.
• Another possibility is to buy an online ticket via internet.
• Special cards are foreseen for students aged 18 or older, which are refunded by the government. Students can choose between a week card or a weekend card.

Implementation in the company:
The introduction of the chip card system was postponed to the end of 2013 because of technical problems with ticket machines. Yet there are other ways of buying a ticket in advance:
• E-ticket to print at home.
• Ticket windows at the big stations.
• Ticket machines at all stations.
• Pre-paid tickets machine-stamped on the day of travel.
• On-board ticket-selling machines with WiFi connection. These can also be used for accessing up-to-date travel information

Success factors – results – evaluation, comments:
A lot of customers have a positive opinion of the chip card system. They do not have to wait in line at a ticket window. The technical requirements still have to be improved. The advantage is that railway staff do not have to handle cash any more.

Contact Person:
Wisse van der Velde  
FNV Bondgenoten  
e-mail: vd.velde@hetnet.nl
Verkehrsverbund Rhein-Ruhr AöR (VRR)  
Germany

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
• Improving public transport quality, security and services
• Countering offender anonymity
• Detering offenders
• Strengthening victims
• Promoting moral courage
• Supporting bus drivers

Description of the initiative:
When an assault takes place in a bus, the driver becomes aware of the situation (either being informed by a passenger or hearing noises indicating an escalating situation). This leads him to stop the bus and assess the situation recorded on his small monitor. He then opens the doors, allowing the attacker to get away, and thus stop assaulting the victim. At the same time he presses the so-called “PräViteS button”, triggering the following:
The control room receives an alarm, with live pictures from inside the bus being displayed. It immediately informs the police of the assault, providing exact details of where it has happened. The live pictures of the assault are displayed on the monitors inside the bus, together with a pre-recorded announcement being repeatedly made over the bus loudspeakers:
“Your attention please. An assault is taking place in this bus. Please take note of what the attacker looks like and how old he is. The police have been informed and will be arriving shortly.”

Implementation in the company:
The PräViteS pilot system has been installed in 15 buses belonging to the Vestische Straßenbahnen public transport company since October 2010.

Success factors – results – evaluation, comments:
The pilot project was evaluated by the European Centre for Crime Protection in Münster. At the end of the evaluation in December 2011, the team responsible conducted a trial run with two comparable groups of test persons at the company. The evaluation of the CCTV tapes, questionnaires and written and oral interviews of the bus drivers led to the following results:
• Witness awareness is raised through being asked to take a good look at the offender. This in turn allows more exact descriptions.
• Interviewing witnesses directly after the incident allows a better description of the offender.
• Passengers feel better able to deal with violence.
• Their feeling of security is enhanced by the system.

Contact Person:
Martina Weinknecht  
Team leader responsible for security  
Service and the ZKS coordination centre (VRR)  
Telephone: +49 209 1584270  
e-mail: weinknecht@vrr.de
THE CAMERA SURVEILLANCE PROJECT OF THE SNCB-GROUP

SNCB-Holding
Belgium

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
Over the last 17 years, the SNCB Holding has gone ahead with the installation of 3225 CCTV cameras in 95 Belgian stations and 850 additional cameras in 113 other railway locations. The GroupeSNCB thus has the country’s largest CCTV network.

Description of the initiative/activity:
The SNCB-Holding has different types of camera in operation. Cameras were initially located in places accessible to the public, such as stations and car and bicycle parks. These were followed by places not accessible to the public, such as administrative buildings and ticket offices.

Cameras are used both for surveillance and for recognition/identification purposes. Images are monitored in real-time and stored for possible later use by the judiciary.

Should operators notice something, they can send the CCTV footage to the police or the judicial authorities. CCTV footage is also sent at the request of the police or the public prosecutor. Footage is stored for a maximum of 7 days, though, when requested by the police or the public prosecutor, this period can be extended up to 30 days.

Video-surveillance (CCTV) goals are to be found in the whole field of safety and security, with a special focus on pro-activeness, prevention and reactivity.

Implementation in the company:
The SNCB Holding has its own security division, the Corporate Security Service, responsible for coordinating the whole range of security operations within the GroupeSNCB. The division has three main departments, Operations, Security Management and Prevention and Citizen Security, and the use of CCTV has developed across these three pillars.

The “Operations” department is responsible for managing and staffing the call centre - the “Security Operations Centre” or SOC -, in which all CCTV operations are centralised.

The “Security Management” department is responsible for site inspects/analyses and setting up security projects involving for instance advisory services regarding the number and location of cameras.

The “Prevention and Citizen Security” department is responsible for informing municipal authorities and the police of where cameras are placed, as well as providing information on the legislation governing requests for CCTV footage belonging to the SNCB Holding.

Success factors – results – evaluation:
The CCTV system provides added value to the different links of the security chain. Looking first at the preventive aspect, CCTV can help prevent or reduce subjective and objective insecurity. Turning to the proactive aspect, CCTV allows incidents to be detected before they actually happen, allowing proactive intervention and avoiding a domino effect.

The CCTV system also has a reactive role, in particular in identifying and following the perpetrators of misdeeds, identifying possible witnesses, and, in certain cases helping in security staff training/briefing. An analysis of requests for CCTV footage shows that requests are on the increase. Whereas the Security Operations Centre dealt with 829 requests in 2008, this figure had more than quadrupled by 2011, when 4,054 requests were registered. In the majority of cases, the searches ended up with positive results. Most of the time, the requests for CCTV footage involve cases of robbery or physical violence.

All in all, one can say that the CCTV system plays a relatively important role in ensuring safety within the rail network. It needs however to be stressed that all the links of the security chain are linked together. Though the CCTV link is important in the fight against insecurity, its effectiveness can also be cancelled out, should any of the other links fail. Over and above CCTV, it is therefore necessary to give priority to an overall integrated approach to security in order to obtain optimal results.

Contact Person:
Hendrik Vanderkimpen
Head of the Corporate Security Service
SNCB-Holding
Rue de France 52–54
1060 Brussels
e-mail: corporatesecurityservice@b-holding.be
Swiss Federal Railways
Switzerland

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
• To increase the public’s subjective sense of security
• To reduce criminal offences as well as incivility and disorder
• To promote social responsibility and civil courage in society
• To improve the image of public transport
• To sustainably reduce the tendency of individuals to resort to violence through conflict resolution and de-escalation

Description of the initiative:
• Conspicuous, “deliberate” presence; low-threshold conflict resolution (mediation) in larger railway stations, in trains and en route to railway stations.
• Provision of simple assistance and information to customers/travelers and interested people in larger railway stations, in trains and en route to railway stations.
• Reporting acts of aggression, vandalism, soiling etc. to local authorities (e.g. Police)
• Role model function.

Implementation in the company:
• Incorporated in the public security structure of Swiss Federal Railways as a branch of the Transport Police Force
• 200 Adopt-a-station schemes
• 20 Preventive assistants
• Numerous Schoolchildren’s escorts
• Infrastructure shared with Transport Police Force

Success factors – results – evaluation, comments:
• Credibility
• Decency
• Presence

Results
• Decreasing numbers of acts of aggression and vandalism
• Positive customer feedbacks

Contact Person:
Mr Arnold Wittwer
Head of Prevention
SBB Transport Police
Domacherstrasse 7
CH-4603 Olten
Telephone: +41 51 2296178
e-mail: arnold.wittwer@sbb.ch
OBJECTIVES 

The purpose of the initiative/activity is to get an overview of the working climate of the train personnel and find out how they deal with different hostile and threatening situations.

DESCRIPTION OF THE INITIATIVE 

A study with interviews of train and subway personnel was conducted to find out how they dealt with difficult clients. The study was conducted during 2010 as a result of an increasing amount of reports amongst on board personnel regarding threats and hostile behaviour. The Swedish administration for Working Environment had statistical evidence that approximately 50% of all the reported work injuries were related to violence, threats or robberies in this sector of work. A survey also reported that 46% of the union members had been exposed to threats or violence the past year. 74% of the members reported an increased risk of being exposed to violence and threats whilst working alone. 44% of the members reported they were afraid of being exposed to violence or threats. The result of the interviews not only corroborated the survey but also showed an increased incidence of dealing with difficult clients in general.

THE INTERVIEWS 

The interviews were conducted to find out which different situations on board personnel was facing (such as verbal offences, threats, violence etc) and to see how the individual coped with and managed these situations. The outcome/result of the interviews showed that personnel that had received and undertaken training was much more self-confident and could prevent or avert threatening or hostile situations. The personnel had often worked out own strategies for this and they were much more aware of the surrounding environment, personal skills, approach, their social competence and ability to refute.

IMPLEMENTATION IN THE COMPANY 

“During the recent and latest collective bargaining negotiations between the Union and the employers organization in the sector the working environment of the onboard personal was discussed. As a result of these negotiations a joint working group was formed. The parties conducted a seminar where the employers and representatives from the Union were invited. Being a member of the employers organization ALMEGA, SJ AB was designated to be a representative of the organization in the joint work to establish a “good practice” recommendation as the company has a comprehensive routine and structured way of work in regards to increase the safety of the personal. The working process for this involved actions to improve the know-how and competence of the employees, better security, clear and defined routines and working processes, personal alarms through smartphones, available guards at the stations etc. The safety and security has been increased by reduction of risks and that SJ AB has a structured way of following up on incidents from both a safety and staff level and perspective. After having applied this working process for now two years SJ AB can already demonstrate the effect and result of this work. The sick leave index has decreased which can be compared to the increased employee overall satisfaction. Incidents where employees have been involved has decreased. The Trade Unions and the Safety Delegation group within the company also testify that the working environment is calmer, workers feel more confident to deal with difficult situations than before the program was implemented.”

SUCCESS FACTORS – RESULTS – EVALUATION, COMMENTS 

The interviews also showed that where the company gave the right support to the employees the results were quicker. The interviews showed that the personnel needed the company to support them in not only education or training but also give the staff a certain amount of freedom of handling (control vs. service) and good back-up support, such as enough staff, guards when needed, technological devices and clear and distinct policies.

CONTACT PERSON 

Maria Olwæus  
Fackförbundet ST  
P.O. Box 5308  
102 47 Stockholm  
Sweden  
Telephone: +46 8 7905239  
Mobile: +46 70 5085239  
e-mail: maria.olwaeus@st.org
IMPROVED PREVENTION SCHEME FOR ON-BOARD SECURITY PERSONNEL

FILT-CGIL
Italy

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
The goal of the project is to identify a series of possible ways of preventing aggression against train conductors and creating a better and safer working environment aboard the trains.

These propositions were analyzed by the Comitato di Direzione, a committee that manages the time, resources and funds for this project.

The improvement prevention scheme for on-board security personnel is the work of the Direzione Reg. Tosc. (the regional headquarters of Trenitalia in the Tuscany Region), in collaboration with the Tuscan Administration.

Description of the initiative:
The scheme includes:
• joint efforts of the regional headquarters of Trenitalia in Tuscany, Polfer, and Trenitalia’s Security Department.
  It has been implemented for the establishment of a number of intervention generalized throughout the country (1600) with sorting the various Central Polfer according to the position taken by the association to train the cell PdA
• training personnel and employees
  The one-day training course, held by an official Polfer expert, involves raising awareness for one’s surroundings, and training quick thinking and reflexes in the face of physical threats. The goal is to train and inform conductors on what they need to do in dangerous situations.
• better communications for employees and passengers
  In addition to the training, a series of activities have been planned. These focus on improving internal communications within the train crew with the aim of supporting them in their duties, and on enhancing external communications, making travellers aware of anti-evasion measures and the role of the train crew.
• improvement proposals relating to the agreement with the Police.

Implementation in the company:
Giving the project a legal framework, the written laws are referred to in the 2008 “direttiva” uni en ISO 9001.

Additionally, we give credit to the regional headquarters of Trenitalia in Tuscany for the initiatives and responsibilities formulated to make this project a reality.

The project took place in Tuscany, a region accounting for 9% of the Italian railway network. It involved all the region’s 500 train conductors.

The project was implemented in different phases, with times fixed for each intervention field; the first actions started in June 2011, others followed in early September, with the main ones rolled out by the end of that year. Everything was finished by the end of the first half of 2012.

Success factors – results – evaluation, comments:
At present steps are being taken to monitor the number of assaults and the “lost-time days” caused by them.
All this in being done in order to assess whether the project objectives have been achieved.

Contact Person:
FILT-CGIL
Metello Borchi
e-mail: metello.borchi@gmail.com
Person in charge international department
Adele Pellegrini
e-mail: internazionale@filtcgil.it
SNCF HANDBOOK ON PREVENTING ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND PROVIDING SUPPORT TO STAFF VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE (RH00955)

SNCF / CFDT
FRANCE

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
The aim of this handbook is to introduce a national framework for all regional staff, listing measures to be taken in the field of preventing acts of violence and the support to be given to staff victims of such acts.

Description of the initiative:
The handbook has three main sections:
• 1) Preventing acts of violence
• 2) Support for victims
• 3) Follow-up arrangements

1) Preventing acts of violence is based on two measures needing to be introduced throughout the company:
• staff training and work organisation need to include the recognition and analysis of risk situations
• preventive arrangements. These include: ‘CHSCT’ Committees on Health, Safety and Working Conditions; partnerships set up by the Security Division with public authorities, local authorities, the national education authorities, social workers and the government; training measures; security-related organisational measures within the company.

2) Support measures for staff victims are to be introduced by management teams. The handbook lists the specific steps to be taken in the following categories: immediate measures, measures while the victim is off sick, measures once he starts back at work, support and counselling, financial compensation, possible measures to be taken when faced by collective reactions.

3) Follow-up arrangements involve 3 national and regional bodies responsible for ex-post follow-up.

Implementation in the company:
This handbook came into effect on 1 February 2011 and applies throughout the SNCF.

Success factors – results – evaluation:
This handbook provided a common base for a well-organised roll-out, with measures having been introduced successively over time.
Progress has been seen mainly in communication and an increase in training activities.
The improvement lies in the way the arrangements are monitored, with a unit with overall responsibility to be created. This unit will cover all aspects, whatever the job role involved, thereby enabling the definition of common measures.

Contact Person:
Eric Moulin
SNCF – HR Division Industrial relations
34 rue du Commandant Mouchotte
75014 Paris
France
Telephone: +33 1 53256666
e-mail: eric.moulin@sncf.fr

FGTE-CFDT Cheminots
Delphine Woittez
e-mail: delphine.woittez@sncf.fr
Rémi Aufrere
e-mail: aufrere@fgte-cfdt.org
TRAINING AND INFORMATION
PREVENTION OF THREATS AND VIOLENCE

SJ AB
Sweden

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
The focus of the course is to assume that anyone, at any time can board a train. All ticket controls will occur on board. Since it is impossible to eliminate and foresee all risks and attitudes, employees must be taught how to handle situations as professionally as possible and minimise the personal safety risk. A key objective is to increase safety in everyday life for on-board personnel and to learn to manage threatening situations in a non-violent manner.

The objective is to increase employees’ knowledge and competency in conflict management, as well as to gain a structure within the company to focus on follow-ups and continuous improvement of the operation to reduce threats and violence-related health issues among the staff.

Description of the initiative:
The training is directed primarily at on-board personnel. Prior to the course, all incident reports, policies and procedures are reviewed. The work environment on trains will be documented based on a personal safety aspect by an authorised risk management company. The objective is to determine whether parts of the work environment are more exposed than others and how employees can use the work environment in the best possible manner. In addition, reviews will be conducted with impacted managers, as well as HR to gain their views of where the greatest risks to employees lie.

The next step is to implement the training. The course comprises of five different blocks; personal safety, conflict management and self-insight, laws and regulations, self-protection, as well as recovering from a tough day at work. The focus is to provide employees with tools that can be used in their daily work e.g. meeting passengers and to recognise their own roles in a conflict. During training, operational shortcomings experienced by employees during daily work will also be compiled and categorised.

When the training course has been completed, feedback from shortcomings in the operation will be presented to management and HR, which will subsequently be responsible for taking measures and updating procedures and policies and follow-up. In the event of new incidents, these will be followed up and individual debriefing will be based on a personal safety perspective and where feedback will be provided to the employee and management. Did the employee react in the correct manner? Could the situation have been avoided? Or, are there further actions that must be taken as preventive measure? All parts of the training course aim to prevent and avoid new serious incidents.

Implementation in the company:
Work commenced as a pilot in two of the most exposed districts in Sweden. This was followed by work in the remaining districts in the country. The work method has now been fully implemented and employees at SJ’s travel agencies have also been trained. Approximately 1,000 employees have currently been trained and the remainder will be trained next year. During 2013, train drivers will also be trained in conflict management and personal safety.

The courses are implemented by specially trained individuals from the authorised external risk management company, SRS (Scandinavian Risk Solutions), SJ’s healthcare service, Manpower and SJ’s proprietary training academy SJ Service Academy. HR also participated in the courses in order to accumulate viewpoints and opinions from employees. The courses were also provided to managers and supervisors to provide information on the everyday life of on-board personnel, as well as to improve knowledge on how to support employees who have had a tough day at work. All new employees, including hourly paid employees, will undergo an abbreviated basic training course in threats and violence.

Success factors – results – evaluation, comments:
The success factor is to acknowledge that it is impossible to prevent all risks; instead, it involves the role of the individual staff member and how situations that arise are managed. Additional success factors include following up incidents in terms of personal safety and in cases of shortcomings, highlight and rectify these in the organisation. Training is as equally important as other preventive measures implemented.

The measurable results we see today include the decline in the number of incidents, reduced sick-leave, employees are more satisfied with their work situation and tangible shortcomings in the operation have been identified and rectified.

Contact Person:
Anna Johnsson, SJAB
Telephone: +46 76 1408479
e-mail: Anna.johnsson@sj.se
TRAININGS, ARD – ACTION, REACTION, DEDEESCALATION

ÖBB, vida
Austria

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
• To have staff displaying confidence when handling difficult situations
• Mastering critical situations involving customers
• Applying de-escalation tactics

Description of the initiative:
Target groups: Ticket inspectors, on-board service staff, train conductors
Content: Confident behaviour, verbal and non-verbal communication, the effect of keeping one’s distance, recognising when a customer is prepared to use violence, possibilities of de-escalating critical situations
Forms of work: Combined theory/practice courses: video analysis, best practices, role-play, dealing with “difficult situations”, discussing experiences and successful de-escalation tactics.

Implementation in the company:
Is already being used by ÖBB Personenverkehr AG

Success factors – results – evaluation, comments:
Two teams in a few trains, self-defence (ARD), ticket inspection in the station, bans on entering stations, CCTV in local trains, support/recognition for traumatised staff

Contact Person:
vida
Peter Traschkowitsch
e-mail: peter.traschkowitsch@vida.at

ÖBB
Gerhard Schiffauer
e-mail: gerhard.schiffauer@oebb.at
SECURITY TRAINING FOR DB STAFF – FULFILLING DIFFERENT NEEDS

Deutsche Bahn AG (Corporate Security) 
Germany

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
• Increased motivation, job satisfaction and commitment
• Acquire and upgrade security-relevant expertise
• Corporate identity
• Response to current developments
• Raising methodological and social competence
• Action and legal certainty

Description of the initiative:
Target groups: Corporate security staff, employees in our response centre, corporate security management, security managers, front-line employees, security staff in stations and trains

Activities: Training program “Certified courses in security management”, Function-specific training course (e.g. de-escalation), basic security training course, courses with federal police and other partners, CVET

Content: Communication tools, dialogue techniques, security awareness, conflict management, dealing with groups, stress management, criminal law, provisional arrest, reporting, emergency facilities, techniques specific to railways, self-protection, use of self-defence techniques, improvised explosive devices, graffiti and vandalism, violence against customers and staff, moral courage, fire prevention, communication and reporting procedures for routine and emergency situations, daily threats – problems resulting from crime, fraud, fare evasion, anti-social behaviour, security risk assessment and management, response to external threats (by phone, fax, e-mail)

Methods: Several training instruments are used for training the different groups of staff (classroom training, seminars, workshops, desk exercises etc.)

Implementation in the company:
Responsibilities: Employee training is the responsibility of the organization. Employee development is a shared responsibility of management and the individual employee. The responsibility of management is to provide the right resources and an environment that supports the career and development needs of the individual employees and target groups.

Years of experience: Security training has been a feature of the organization for more than 10 years

Success factors – results – evaluation, comments:
Evaluation: Group discussion during training, subtopic of regular management meetings, feedback questionnaire filled in by trainee, quality checks

Contact Person:
Deutsche Bahn AG
Corporate Security
Security Coordination and Principles
Katharina Rothe
Potsdamer Platz 2
10785 Berlin
Telephone: + 49 30 29761450
e-mail: katharina.rothe@deutschebahn.com
TRAININGS ON A LEGAL BASIS AND POSTURES FOR A TRAIN CONDUCTOR. WHAT ARE THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES FOR A TRAIN CONDUCTOR AND MEASURES OF PROTECTION

SNCF
FRANCE

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
The security of people and property is a prime concern of our company, and relates not just to our customers but also to our staff. Our company is committed to listening to customers, staff and its partners, thereby helping it to better meet their expectations with regard to safety and security. In this respect, the management of any risk of violence encountered when working as a train conductor (Agent du Service Commercial Trains or ASCT for short) is a priority in each passenger train region (Etablissement Commerciaux trains or ECT for short).

To meet this need, all ECTs are organised in a way similar to that introduced in the area of train and staff security. The evolution of mentalities and behaviour has influenced relations between staff and customers. The SNCF has identified this as a concern and has decided to take measures aimed at solving the security problems encountered by its staff.

Staff are always likely to encounter individuals with unpredictable reactions on platforms and in trains, and the question is to find ways of reducing the number and consequences of acts of aggression. Security plays a crucial role in the provision of rail services, on a par with rail safety.

In this context, two specific training courses have been designed for all SNCF train conductors:
1. A 5-day training course as part of the initial training received on first joining the company.
1. A 1-day refresher course taken once every three years.

Description of the initiative:
The initial 5-day training course covers the following aspects:
• the legal aspects necessary for performing the work in general, as well as the attitudes, rules, behaviour and position to adopt when dealing with an individual
• raising awareness for aggressive phenomena (how to behave when facing danger, hostility, etc.)
• working in line with available ground support schemes (the Rennes Support Centre, PC National Security, support stations, ...)

The 1-day refresher course (to be taken once every 3 years) covers the following aspects:
• information on latest security incidents, any amendments to regulatory provisions and/or procedures
• skill upgrades, via role-play (relating to real-life situations) supervised by a security trainer and a psychologist
• refreshing the skills needed to apply job-related procedures, understanding and managing conflict situations.

These courses, given by experienced instructors and in-house psychologists, have several goals:
• enabling all SNCF train conductors to take the necessary measures when confronted with conflict situations and/or uncivil behaviour (taking action in collaboration with their security partners and preserving their physical and moral integrity).
• ensuring the security of people and property on board trains
• working alone or in a team in complete safety
• setting an example vis-à-vis customers, whether in terms of the language used or service attitudes

The initial courses take place on our university campuses, the refresher courses in our regional centres. The learning part involves job-related behaviour and security recommendations (service attitudes, posture, ticket inspection, use of procedures, management of conflict situations) and takes place in trains in our Technicentres.

Using simulated situations, the instructors always work in pairs, with one of them acting the part of a passenger without a ticket, and the other doing the debriefing at the end of the session with all course participants.

The objective of this role-play is to put participants in a position to manage conflict situations encountered during their work, to make sure that nothing happens to them or other passengers/colleagues, and to know when to involve the security partners.

The second objective is to raise the awareness of a future train conductor to the importance of knowing the right ways to deal with customers, using the right language and working with colleagues and partners.
Implementation in the company:
The company is committed to making sure that all train conductors have received security training with the agreed timeframe. Conductors are given a “security” manual, containing security recommendations and legal background information. Their managers are responsible for ensuring that they keep their knowledge up-to-date, for identifying any gaps (by accompanying them on trains) and/or any need for security training. When a conductor becomes a victim of violence, he is supported by the company and helped by one of his superiors in everything needing to be done (emergency treatment, filing a complaint, court proceedings, etc.).

Feedback from conductors in the wake of any security-related incident takes place locally, with the instructor network being informed.

Success factors – results – evaluation:
The security training for train conductors has evolved since its first introduction in 1999, being adapted to new statutory requirements, to the rise in cases of abuse in trains and stations, etc.

This training course has contributed to a significant drop in acts of violence against conductors:
• when there are several conductors on one train, they no longer inspect tickets in one coach by themselves, instead following the security recommendations and working in pairs
• they call for the assistance of their partners when it is no longer possible to talk with a passenger without a ticket
• they make sure they always stand in the right position when inspecting tickets, always having the possibility of getting away and avoiding violence
• they are able to detect dangerous situations
• they know the legal bounds within which they carry out their work and what they are entitled to do and what not

Conductors have really grasped the importance of adhering to these recommendations:
• A conductor is above all to be seen as playing a commercial role, not overstepping his prerogatives by dealing with the breach of rules as if he were a policeman or magistrate. He can thus avoid getting into situations where he needs to handle a breach as a crime and can protect himself against painful physical and psychological trauma. Knowing when to pass on the baton is all part of his work as a conductor.

Contact Person:
Alain Le Goff
Instructor
Campus Paris
Université du Service
103, avenue François Arago
92017 Nanterre Cedex VFE
Telephone: +33 1 55177094
e-mail: alain.le_goff@sncf.fr
REHABILITATION MEASURES FOR AFFECTED STAFF AT DB SICHERHEIT

Deutsche Bahn AG / DB Sicherheit GmbH
Germany

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
- Reduction of existing fears and uncertainties among the employees concerned; guidelines for the managers of the employees concerned.
- To ensure individual support and initiate suitable support measures
- To enforce claims for damages against the perpetrator.
- Ex ante reviews and assessments of assaults, recognising sources of danger and taking appropriate counteraction.

Description of the initiative:
How the employee concerned is contacted when initiating aftercare measures is dependent on he has a medical certificate (i.e. is off sick) or not. Where the employee is off sick, he may be contacted in written form.

1. Personal meeting
   - Immediately or as soon as possible
   - Aftercare when the employee concerned is on sick leave.

2. Contact
   - Via a “get well” letter sent by the regional manager / head of production / head of operations
   - Afterwards as under (1)

3. Further regular meetings with the employee concerned
   - Counselling on support services / necessary measures

Employer duties:
According to regulations, a person directly affected needs to be immediately replaced, as he may act irrationally under shock. Any decision on whether other employees need to be replaced is to be taken at the scene of the incident.

Effective aftercare includes the following:
- regular contact with the employees concerned and with their team leaders
- making sure that aftercare is continuous
- help in filling out forms, claims, etc.
- arranging visits to the company doctor, psychologists, counselling and legal services, etc. (via the corresponding DB divisions)
- provision of information material

All people involved (regional managers, heads of production, HR staff, team leaders and command and control staff) have clearly defined tasks. All need to receive training/instructions on what is expected of them.

Success factors – results – evaluation, comments:
Implementation is ongoing. The first few meetings have already taken place. The guidelines are being implemented. As the scheme was only recently introduced, no results can yet be announced.

Contact Person:
DB Sicherheit Corporate Works Council
Jörg Behling
Caroline-Michaelis-Strasse 5–11
10115 Berlin
e-mail: joerg.behling@deutschebahn.com
SUPPORT OF AFFECTED STAFF AGAINST THE PERPETRATOR

DEVK Sach and HUK VVaG – a DB AG corporate employee benefit
Germany

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
Beneficiaries: employees working for the Deutsche Bahn AG (German Railways) or other rail companies, members of rail and transport trade unions.

Description of the initiative:
• The project was initiated by what was then the TRANSNET trade union (now the EVG).
• The aim of the initiative is to provide public transport employees with better material cover following verbal or physical attacks
• Enforcing claims against the perpetrator(s) without the risk of having to pay legal costs.
• Protecting victims’ rights - legal costs in the context of civil action (claims for damages and compensation for pain and suffering) against attackers are covered
• Cover for any legal work before the start of proceedings in the context of support for the injured party (legal work such as going through (criminal) records, or expert fees)
• Cover for any legal work involving the offender paying compensation to the victim, i.e. safeguarding victims’ interests, even when the offender has acknowledged his guilt and accepted an out-of-court settlement
• Cover for appeals when enforcing claims associated with social security, e.g. Claims for pension payments

Implementation in the company:
• Inclusion in the Deutsche Bahn AG’s portfolio of corporate employee benefits
• Integration into the DEVK’s claims service and service hotline
• Joint management of claims, involving trade unions, works councils and other social institutions

Success factors – results – evaluation, comments:
• Well accepted by staff as a support measure in dealing with the consequences of verbal and physical attacks
• A unique measure, not found anywhere else in the German trade union landscape

Contact Person:
DEVK Insurance Company
Jörg Wertheimer
International business relations
Telephone: +49 221 7572335
Mobile: + 49 172 2928194
e-mail: joerg.wertheimer@devk.de
SOCIAL PARTNER AGREEMENTS

TRAVELLING IN SAFETY (SICHER UNTERWEGS)

EVG / Deutsche Bahn AG / Corporate Works Councils of DB Fernverkehr AG, Regio AG, DB Vertriebs GmbH, DB Sicherheit GmbH, DB Station & Service Germany

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
Binding agreement between the social partners for protecting staff throughout the company against harassment and violence at work through preventive measures and aftercare.

Description of the initiative:
The “Sicher unterwegs” initiative was launched in 2008 by the EVG, the union that resulted from the merger of TRANSMIT and GDBA. A range of actions, measures and campaigns are used to raise awareness for the problem within the companies concerned and among politicians and staff. These include nationwide surveys of staff and passengers on “security and feeling safe”, and media and awareness campaigns targeting politicians, transport companies, the authorities ordering transport services and the various service providers. Support for the “Sicher unterwegs” campaign was quickly gained from further lobby groups, such as the passenger association “ProBahn” and the “Pro-rail Alliance”, and the EVG was awarded the German “Passenger Prize” in 2010.

First talks between the EVG and the Deutsche Bahn started in 2009, aimed at jointly reaching a binding agreement on protection for staff and passengers. These ended with the “Sicher unterwegs” agreement between the Deutsche Bahn AG, the corporate works councils and the EVG being signed in October 2010. In it, the Deutsche Bahn undertakes to take a range of (legal) measures aimed at helping all concerned to have greater protection and feel safer. Within their respective responsibilities, the corporate works councils have further developed the topic. Regular meetings take place between the partners for checking the agreement’s effectiveness and/or working on further measures.

Implementation in the company:
The “Sicher unterwegs” initiative has now become a brand name” within the Deutsche Bahn AG, with all activities in this area now consolidated under this heading. The Deutsche Bahn and the corporate works councils take responsibility for the topic within their respective fields of competence. The Deutsche Bahn coordinates all measures and actions via its Corporate Security Department and the security managers in the respective lines of business. Its policy concentrates on using people instead of CCTV, with the latter only being used where necessary. To help make people feel safer, it is seen as important to have security staff present on the ground. The agreement’s partners hold an annual meeting where they discuss the effectiveness of the policy and whether any new measures are needed.

Success factors – results – evaluation, comments:
The “Sicher unterwegs” agreement
- contains a series of binding statements and agreements, including a corporate commitment to deploy more staff. In cases where the number of train conductors is set by the ordering authority, all sides are to work on getting the latter to specify higher numbers of conductors. Looking at the DB’s security department, DB Sicherheit, headcount has been raised by 500.
- The Deutsche Bahn has undertaken to introduce comprehensive prevention measures. These include cooperation agreements with schools, the development of law and order partnerships, staff training, mandatory de-escalation courses and awareness campaigns targeting the public.
- More headcount is to be deployed in the field of prevention and de-escalation.
- With regard to aftercare, each employee is entitled to legal protection and psychological and social support.

The “Sicher unterwegs” initiative does not just involve the Deutsche Bahn. Further lobby organisations are helping promote it at a more general policy level. Under the leadership of the “Pro-rail Alliance” for instance, transport and police unions, public transport companies, local transport service providers and passenger associations are promoting the topic politically, with the aim of getting politicians to acknowledge their responsibility and provide adequate resources for protecting staff and passengers.

Contact Person:
Eisenbahn- und Verkehrsgewerkschaft (EVG)
Reiner Bieck, Stefan Leuschner
Weilburger Straße 24, 60326 Frankfurt
Telephone: +49 69 7536219
e-mail: reiner.bieck@evg-online.org

TRANSMIT GmbH
Peter Tröge
Chausseestraße 84, 10115 Berlin
Telephone: +49 30 3087523
e-mail: peter.troege@transmit-gmbh.de
AGREEMENT ON PREVENTION OF WORK RELATED HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

The Agreement is signed between the President of the Federation of transport trade unions in Bulgaria (FTTUB) and the Mayor of Sofia. The Mayor is principal of the four municipal public transport companies in Sofia.

Bulgaria

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
• To raise awareness on the existence of all forms of violence against women in urban public transport in order to prevent violence as a part of their job.
• To take preventive measures to decrease the work related violence and harassment against women.

Description of the initiative:
On 25th November 2009, FTTUB initiated a campaign regarding the 10th anniversary of the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women. The campaign started with a Round table discussion, followed by an Agreement for joint actions on Prevention of work related harassment and violence against women in the urban public transport companies in Sofia, signed by the Mayor of Sofia Yordanka Fandakova and the President of FTTUB Ekaterina Yordanova.

The objectives of the Round table were:
• To raise awareness of the importance of the problem
• To encourage women to report cases of violence
• To work out preventive actions

As a result of the issues raised and the discussion during the round table, the social partners agreed to support the following actions:
• To collect information about cases of violence against women
• To analyse the data
• To organise campaigns
• To develop recommendations on preventive measures for elimination of violence against women

Implementation in the company:
The first step was gathering information about the existence and nature of violence which women face in their work. An anonymous questionnaire was developed and spread by the team of the FTTUB and the leaders of its affiliated trade unions in all structures and units of the urban public transport companies in Sofia. On designated sites special boxes were set up, in which the completed questionnaires and other reports of violence were collected. The boxes were labeled with stickers saying “THERE IS SOMEBODY TO SHARE WITH” and “Women together against the workplace violence”, carefully designed to attract maximum attention.

In a period of six months, the questionnaires were collected and then analysed. The results and conclusions of the analysis were published on the website of FTTUB and a special newsletter devoted to the problem was distributed among all workers. On 25th of November 2010, the results were presented to the Sofia City Council’s Commission of Transport, The CEOs of the urban transport companies in Sofia and the local trade union leaders. Thus, their awareness of the seriousness of the issue was raised and also they were convinced of the necessity of preventive measures to be taken.

Success factors – results – evaluation, comments:
Based on the survey, the following Recommendations on preventing and eliminating work related violence against women were presented and handed out to the companies’ management.
• To create and maintain database of any forms of violence against women in the workplace
• To specify clear procedures that must be followed in case of violence
• To develop training plans and programs
• To organize joint campaigns such as “zero tolerance” campaign etc.
• To discuss the issue with social partners and seek joint solutions
• To study and implement “best practices” to combat violence

In 2010, a Chapter “Prevention of workplace violence” was proposed by FTTUB to be included in the Sectoral Collective Agreement /concluded April 2010/. Main articles are:
1. Employer together with the trade unions shall take effective measures to prevent workers from all forms of physical and psychosocial abuse, and ensure working conditions that help to prevent workers from chronic work related stress, physical and mental disabilities.
2. The employer is obliged to pursue a policy of zero tolerance against discrimination and workplace violence in its various manifestations - physical, mental and sexual.
3. The parties shall develop training plans to raise awareness of managers and employees in order to identify signs of abuse and workplace violence, and to initiate preventive or corrective actions. These measures should be applicable in case of third party violence.

4. The Employer shall develop procedures to be followed in cases of violence, which must contain: Immediate and fair internal investigation; Statistics; Follow-up; Adequate disciplinary measures against the perpetrators in case they are employees in the same establishment; Aftercare - support for the victim /financial, psychological, reintegration support.

In May 2010 the Mayor of Sofia initiated and supported a self defense course for women, aiming to give a model for reaction in particular situation of attack. The trainers were experts in security and self defense, psychology and law. During the course violence was seen in two aspects - when the assailant is a stranger and when he/she is a familiar person. The course, consisting of theory and exercises, continued 3 months. Although at the beginning of this initiative the women were very skeptical, and even it was difficult to form a group for the training, at the end they admitted that the self-defence course allowed all participants to achieve physical fitness, self-confidence and a feeling of greater security.

During this long term campaign FTTUB invited and encouraged men to take part in all the activities. The level of participation and involvement of men was surprisingly high. They stated that everything that is done for women, at the end of the day is good for everybody, not only for women.

In July 2012 FTTUB organized a round table with the decision making bodies of the capital’s urban public transport companies where the start of “zero tolerance” campaign was discussed.

On the 7th of July, FTTUB signed an “Agreement on prevention of work related harassment and violence against women workers in rail passenger transport” with the Bulgarian national railway operator “BDZ – passengers transport”.

Contact Person:
Daniela Zlatkova
Executive secretary
Federation of transport trade unions in Bulgaria
106, Maria Louisa Blvd
Sofia, 1233
Telephone: +359 931 6001
Telephone: +359 887 888032
Email: d.zlatkova@stsb.bg
www.stsb.bg
SNCF
FRANCE

In July 2011, the CEO of SNCF decided to tackle the issue of incivilities and to launch an in-depth study during the second semester of 2011: meetings with field teams, study of the principle mechanisms which create antisocial behaviour, feedback to the managers. The report was completed by an independent mission during 6 months: first state of the “phenomenon antisocial behaviour” and foreshadowing of a specific unit dedicated to antisocial behaviour. On 6th of December 2011, a round table with the social partners dealing with antisocial behaviour came up with the idea of the establishment of a hotline. Finally, on 24th of September 2012, the CEO of SNCF announced the creation of the “Prevention and management of Antisocial Behaviour Department” in order to implement concrete actions.

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
Establishment of a hotline 30 90 90 (01 53 25 90 90) and an e-mail address: incivilités@sncf.fr

Description of the initiative:
The idea behind these two communication channels is to get staff to speak up, expressing their opinions on this subject. The aim of this internal ‘speak up’ hotline (it is not meant for emergencies or for providing psychological support) is to identify difficulties associated with processes, problems in front office relations and, last but not least, to give staff the opportunity to speak up. Staff and managers with customer contact can use this ‘speak up’ hotline to communicate their perceptions of antisocial behaviour experienced in their routine work.

Implementation in the company:
The ‘speak up’ hotline and the e-mail address are a way for the Prevention and Management of Antisocial Behaviour team (5 people) to obtain valuable information in their fight against antisocial behaviour, using a standard reporting sheet.

Success factors – results – evaluation:
• Availability of the hotline during office hours (it is not a 24/7 hotline).
• Support covers all SNCF job roles without exception (sales staff, conductors, train drivers, etc.)
• National and regional PR explanatory material enabling staff to get to know this initiative.
• Good listening capabilities and strong empathy on the part of those taking the calls.

Contact Person:
SNCF
Prevention and Management of Antisocial Behaviour Department
Céline Debove
Deputy head
34, Rue du Commandant Mouchotte
75014 Paris
Telephone: +33 1 53253133
e-mail: Celine.debove@sncf.fr

JOINT ACTIVITY OF SOCIAL PARTNERS: ROUND TABLE ON ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR
In mid-1999, a joint “anti-aggression” working group was set up. It was made up of representatives from the SNCB and other recognised organisations. The working group holds regular meetings to evaluate the statistics on aggressive incidents and their causes and to discuss measures for countering aggression. Several initiatives for dealing with cases of aggression or preventing them have emerged and are being developed in conjunction with the recognised trade unions. Also involved are representatives from the association of SNCF train conductors and from the following SNCB-Mobility/SNCB-Holding departments: Customer Relations, Security Services, Occupational Medicine and HR.

We regularly (on a quarterly/annual basis) review the so-called “B-MO.1 Aggression Statistics”. What do these contain?

**Aggressive incidents by category**
- cuts and wounds
- mild violence
- threatening behaviour
- insults

These are the four categories punishable under the Belgian Criminal Code.

**Physical/verbal incidents - monthly details**

General speaking, of the cases reported by train conductors, one third involve physical aggression and two-thirds verbal aggression.

**The Top 10 lines at risk**

On the basis of these statistics, an action plan can be drawn up for individual lines where the risk of aggression is highest. These plans involve for example trains being monitored by the SNCB’s Security Service for a certain period of time.

**Aggression by type of train**

This information also helps us to better coordinate Security Service action plans.

**Lost-time incidents**

This data helps us understand the impact aggression is having on our staff and to take appropriate measures for supporting the person in question when he or she resumes work.

- **Physical aggression:**
- **Verbal aggression:**

It turns out that in many cases aggression - whether physical or verbal - leads to an employee being off sick for a large number of days.

**Causes of aggression**

- Breach of transportation rules (travelling without a valid ticket/sitting in the first class with a second-class ticket, etc.)
- Breach of other regulations (boarding a train after the signal has been given for it to depart, soiling or damaging seats, misuse of the alarm system, etc.)
- Others (e.g. unprovoked aggression, theft, addiction, conflicts between passengers, etc.)

**Aggression by time of day**

This information also allows better coordination of the Security Service’s action plans.

**The SNCB’s anti-aggression master plan:**

In 2007, the SNCB drew up an anti-aggression master plan. This is evaluated at each meeting of the joint working group. The plan originally contained 44 measures (preventive/pro-active/repressive/remedial), targeting solely the fight against aggressive behaviour towards train staff. This plan has since evolved and now contains 55 measures. The scope has also been extended to include aggressive behaviour towards station staff (ticketing and platform staff). A certain number of these measures have already been completed, while other are still in the process of being implemented and require regular monitoring. In addition, the master plan also describes the methodology used in assessing lines and trains. This involves a) an “aggression risk rating” (with follow-up ensured solely within the context of the SNCB Security Service’s operational action plan); and b) a “commercial risk rating”, which, in line with its importance, gives rise to a follow-up at operational level, either by the SNCB-Holding’s Security Service or by the SNCB Mobility’s Ticket Control Teams.

**Contact:**
Christine Isaac
Deputy Chief Consultant
B-MO.13 Work environment and support
B-VN.13 – section 13/5 Bâtiment Atrium – 5e étage
Avenue de la Porte de Hal
40 1060 Bruxelles 5.13/7
Telephone: +32 2 5282066
e-mail: christine.isaac@b-rail.be
SNCB-Holding
Belgium

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
We want to reach young people without stigmatizing, focusing on general sensibilization, not only on incidents. Letting young people participate in the station and its surroundings in an active way, without causing nuisance and committing offences:
- Getting to know the station and its actors
- Getting to know the behavioral code
- Indicate risk behavior
- Make the staff more accessible
- Increase the knowledge of the emergency number

Description of the initiative:
The presence of teenagers in trains and stations sometimes causes problems. That’s why the Corporate Security Service has developed a customized project that approaches young people on two levels:
- The proactive level: intended for youngsters who are not yet customers
- The preventive level: for youngsters who already take the train

The target groups are students between 10 and 13 years old. The educational project consists of several modules that can be combined in function of time and need of sensibilization.

Module 1: is a prevention film that serves as an introduction.

Module 2: is a lesson that can be given by the teacher of the school or by some one of the Corporate Security Service. During the lesson we take a closer look at issues that are linked with public transport, such as graffiti, vandalism, pick pocket, nuisance, illegal traffic and aggression. To make the theoretic lesson more interactive, we use images and we play a quiz. The messages we want to bring across are:
- The different actors in the station and the train
- Acceptable behavior
- The dangers
- The emergency number
- Responsibility and contribution to security and feelings of security
- The use of reporting incidents and the value and limits of CCTV

Module 3: is a game, which serves as an evaluation tool. The pupils can play “Security agent” in a station where different security situations occur.

Implementation in the company:
The project will start in 2013. Thirty Belgian schools will be chosen to participate in the first year. Priority will be given to schools that are located close to the tracks or nearby stations, because they are more likely to come in contact with the risks linked to public transport.

Contact Person:
Hendrik Vanderkimpen
Head of the Corporate Security Service
SNCB-Holding
Rue de France 52–54
1060 Brussels
e-mail: corporatesecurityservice@b-holding.be
Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS) Netherlands

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
Education in schools, sport clubs and prisons; the aim of this initiative is to raise young people’s awareness for the consequences of their behavior. The Netherlands government has produced short movies, shown in schools and prisons, with the goal of evoking respect for workers in the public sector.

Description of the initiative:
The movies are produced in an interactive manner for different ages. The young people are confronted with situations to which they have to react.

- Moon-Dog is an education programme made by NS passengers for secondary school children in the 13 – 17 age bracket. It shows them what effects group behaviour and aggression can have on employees and their families.
- Red is an education programme made by NS passengers for primary school children in the 10 – 13 age bracket. Its goal is to show children how dangerous it is to play around the railway. Two train-drivers visit primary schools, telling personal stories and showing the ‘knalrood’ (dark red) movie.

Implementation in the company:
Since 1995 two conductors in uniform have been visiting secondary schools classes, talking about aggression, group behaviour and respect and showing the ‘Moon-dog’ movie. They also visit youth prisons and sports clubs. They talk with the youngsters about the consequences of aggression and group behaviour. Sessions last 2 hours, showing in an interactive manner the consequences not just for the victim and the victim’s family and friends but also for the perpetrator. Important elements of the programme involve the personal stories of conductors who have been victims of aggression.

The ‘Moon-dog’ movie received a nomination at the national film festival ‘Keying into the Brain’ in 2007 and was awarded the ‘Golden Palm’ in Cruesseot.

Success factors – results – evaluation, comments:
The positive reactions of the young people themselves highlight the learning effect of these videos. There are indications that less incidents happen in those areas where the films have been shown. The programme has been running since 1995.

Contact Person:
Peter Heuts
Telephone: +31 886712331
e-mail: peter.heuts@ns.nl
www.luisteris.com
Deutsche Bahn AG / Foundation “Deutsches Forum für Kriminalprävention” ("German Forum for Preventing Crime") and the Freie Universität Berlin. Germany

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
• Reducing / preventing bullying and violence at school
• Fostering social skills and the courage to stand up for one’s convictions
• Fair play
• Tolerance
• Assuming responsibility
• Working to improve the overall climate in class

Description of the initiative:
“observe, intervene, assume responsibility” – this is the motto the “Fairplayer” programme would like to instil in schoolchildren. The aim of the programme is to raise schoolchildren’s awareness for all forms of violence and mobbing, showing them ways of avoiding such conflict situations. Targeting schoolchildren in the 13–15 age bracket, the “Fairplayer” programme is used during lessons for a 3–5 month period. Its special feature is that it does not just target mobbing, but social skills in general.

Programme implementation is in the hands of the Deutsche Bahn AG (which provides funding), the Foundation “Deutsches Forum für Kriminalprävention” ("German Forum for Preventing Crime") and the Freie Universität Berlin.

Implementation in the company:
One of the DB Corporate Security’s focuses is on preventing violence and vandalism through sustained prevention work. For several years now, DB Corporate Security has been responsible for all fields involving prevention, and is well-networked not just with the DB’s lines of business, but also with its long-standing law and order partner, the Federal Police. Prevention is seen not just as a strategy, but is also pro-actively promoted. As part of its close cooperation with the German Forum for Preventing Crime (Deutschen Forum für Kriminalprävention or DFK) and the Freie Universität Berlin, new prevention strategies and approaches are being developed and implemented in various DB lines of business. Schoolchildren constitute one of the target groups here, with the “Fairplayer” project a lynchpin in DB Corporate Security’s prevention strategy.

Success factors – results – evaluation, comments:
The project was launched in 2011 in selected schools, and its use in further schools is currently being looked into. As it is still “early days”, no project evaluation has yet been conducted. Initial findings do however point to the strategy being effective in preventing schoolchildren from resorting to violence.

Contact Person:
Deutsche Bahn AG
Corporate Security
Security Coordination and Principles
Manfred Renner
Potsdamer Platz 2
10785 Berlin
Telephone: +49 30 29761465
e-mail: manfred.m.renner@deutschebahn.com
DVD “10 STEPS TO RAIL COOL”

FNCTTFEL (the public service trade union) and CFL Luxembourg

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
The objectives of the FNCTTFEL and the CFL are to improve security and the feeling of security in public transport.

Description of the initiative:
The FNCTTFEL belongs inter alia to 2 security-related steering committees, one in the Ministry for Sustainable Development and Infrastructures and one at the CFL. The Ministry, the CFL and the FNCTTFEL are working together to fight violence in public transport and to improve security and the feeling of security in trains and buses.

The CFL has produced an education film showing the consequences of uncivilised behaviour and vandalism in an easily understood manner. A youth theatre group depicts everyday scenes, explaining what negative consequences these can have. In this entertaining way, schoolchildren get to know about dangers to passengers and rail employees.

http://vimeo.com/36960866

Success factors – results – evaluation, comments:
With committee work only existing on paper over the last few months, the FNCTTFEL’s efforts have led to work in the two steering committees for public transport security (at the CFL and the Ministry) being restarted.

Implementation in the company:
The Luxembourg railway company CFL and the the public service trade union FNCTTFEL are working together in a number of bodies dealing with staff security: the board of administration, the joint works council, the central delegation, the steering committee on security, employee representation bodies and numerous CFL working groups.

Contact Person:
FNCTTFEL
Georges Merenz
Member of the rail sector executive in the FNCTTFEL
Staff Representative of safety at the CFL
63, rue de Bonnevoie
L-1260 Luxembourg
Telephone: +352 4990 4441
e-mail: georges.merenz@cfl.lu
THE “TRAVELLER AND CITIZEN” PREVENTION PROGRAMME FOR SCHOOLS

SNCF
France

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
This prevention programme addresses rail-related risks and the way people should behave in public transport.

It has a twofold objective:
- to prevent individual accidents involving people on railway premises,
- to help young people acquire the right attitude towards fellow citizens, thereby reducing incivility.

Description of the initiative:
For more than 20 years, the SNCF has been conducting awareness campaigns targeting young people in an effort to reduce accident risks and promote the right sort of behaviour.

In 2006, the SNCF signed a partnership agreement with the French Ministry of Education, officially committing itself to “developing education on safety, security and citizenship in the context of rail transport”.

As part of this agreement, SNCF employees perform voluntary work in schools and colleges. Via the “Traveller and citizen” teaching programme they each year raise the awareness of more than 220,000 schoolchildren towards respect of other people, property and safety rules.

Priority is given to schools located near to railway premises or in areas known for risky behaviour.

Implementation in the company:
This school scheme is piloted by the SNCF’s Citizen Relations Centre within its Sustainable Development Department, with regional roll-out in the hands of 23 local SNCF employees.

The 450 SNCF volunteers going into the school classes come from different walks of life (ticket inspectors, train drivers, security staff, station staff, infrastructure staff, etc.). They share with the schoolchildren their experience, thereby giving the prevention discussion the necessary real-life dimension.

The voluntary aspect of the scheme involves the employees doing this work during working hours. They are given training beforehand, teaching them how to use teaching aids, how to manage a class, and allowing them to better understand the targets they are addressing.

Success factors – results – evaluation:
A new round of the “Traveller and citizen” programme was started in September 2011, when children returned to school after the summer holidays. Using real-life situations (along-side railway tracks, on the platform, in the train, etc.) and interactive tools, the young people acquire hands-on experience of such situations, enabling them to gauge the consequences of what they do. The methodology used is adapted to each age group and the SNCF volunteer can round off his talk with charts, slide shows and recorded interviews with SNCF staff.

A recent satisfaction survey conducted with school staff showed an overall 96% satisfaction rate* for the latest round of this awareness campaign.

Contact Person:
SNCF  
Clémence BECK
Head of Education

Telephone: +33 153 257905

e-mail: clemence.beck@sncf.fr

(* as of 26/10/12)
Deutsche Bahn AG / German Federal Police
Germany

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
Assuming joint responsibility for all public transport security issues.

Description of the initiative:
The Rail Security Conference takes place once a year in the DB Academy at Potsdam's Kaiserbahnhof, and is jointly organised by DB Corporate Security and the Federal Police. High-ranking specialists and managers from the security authorities at federal level and from the German states (Bundesländer) take part, along with representatives from companies, the rail sector and other institutions. The basic idea behind this exchange of views is that public transport security problems can only be overcome through joint action involving all stakeholders. The Federal Police and the Deutsche Bahn incorporate the results of these conferences into their security operations. Since 2011, an internal “International Security Meeting” has been held directly after the Rail Security Conference, with security managers from all DB lines of business taking part. The objective of this meeting is to extend the DB’s corporate security network, exchange practical experience and work on developing joint strategies.

Implementation in the company:
The Rail Security Conference has been taking place once a year since 2008. It was originally initiated by the head of DB Corporate Security and the President of the Federal Police. Corporate Security staff and Federal Police management start work on preparing the concept for the next conference shortly after the latest annual conference has taken place. Each year a different focus is chosen, whereby the scope extends beyond normal rail security. The 2012 focus for instance was “Die Wa(h)re Sicherheit” – security not just as a product but as a concept.

The main findings and results are incorporated into both partners’ security concepts.

Success factors – results – evaluation, comments:
Exchanging views and experiences in a security network is a boon for all conference participants, and the in-depth discussions on new ways of dealing with security are the source of synergies benefiting all.

Contact Person:
Deutsche Bahn AG
Corporate Security
Security Coordination and Principles
Armin Kindler
Potsdamer Platz 2
10785 Berlin
Telephone: +49 30 29761464
e-mail: Armin.Kindler@deutschebahn.com
Deutsche Bahn AG
Germany

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
• Pro-actively providing journalists with security-related information as a way of promoting a positive attitude towards security and presenting a clear picture of what the Deutsche Bahn is doing in the field of security and how successful it is.
• The preventive effect of public relations, acting as a deterrent against potential offenders.

Description of the initiative:
The Deutsche Bahn’s Public Relations and Corporate Security departments are working together to produce regular input for journalists. This includes not just the “fakten” magazine, but also a number of other publications covering specific topics. The aim is not just to provide the media with information, but also to tell stories putting security in a positive light (naturally only highlighting situations with positive objective security).

Implementation in the company:
Input with a relevance to security is made available by the Deutsche Bahn’s Corporate Security to the internal Public Relations Department, whereby the heads of the two departments assume responsibility for the contributions and their content in the sense of (legal) compliance and data protection.

Success factors – results – evaluation, comments:
Close cooperation, regular information updates and pro-active dealings with the media are seen as a way of positively highlighting security issues.

Contact Person:
Deutsche Bahn AG
Corporate Security
Security Coordination and Principles
Tanja Anderson
Potsdamer Platz 2
10785 Berlin
Telephone: +49 30 29761639
e-mail: tanja.anderson@deutschebahn.com

"SOKO BAHN" INFORMATION FOR JOURNALISTS

Wie die Bahn für Sicherheit kämpft

5,700 Bahnhöfe, 2,700 Züge und 7,5 Millionen Reisende täglich in Deutschland. Hier positiv ist weniger als im übrigen öffentlichen Raum. Ein Bericht über die Aktivitäten von Kunden und Mitarbeitern.

SOKO Bahn
Wie der DB-Konzern seine Kunden schützt.
BAROMETER FOR MEASURING THE FEELING OF INSECURITY AND THE VIGILANCE OF CUSTOMERS AND NON-CUSTOMERS ON SNCF PREMISES

SNCF FRANCE

Objectives of the initiative/activity:
Producing a billion journeys a year within a network covering the whole of France, SNCF is confronted with the same security problems facing French society. Completely open to the public, SNCF premises reflect this to a large extent. Trains and stations are meeting places for travellers, friends and consumers from a wide range of different social and cultural backgrounds. They are places where all form of friction inherent to society can arise. Looking at SNCF, rising delinquency within society is reflected by infringements in the rules governing the use of SNCF premises, assaults on people and antisocial behaviour. By making people feel increasingly unsafe on SNCF premises, these security incidents have a wider effect, meaning that we need to take into account their overall impact and the feelings they engender. Insecurity can also lead to avoidance behaviour, thus having an economic impact in terms of loss of business or profit.

In an attempt to prevent and reduce acts of delinquency, SNCF has available a wide range of human and technical resources. The main task of SNCF’s Security Division is to reconcile security and service:

- knowing and understanding – both quantitatively and qualitatively – what delinquency is all about
- maintaining production efficiency
- helping to inspire trust and confidence in customers, staff and public opinion, especially in terms of service quality.

The goal here is to keep everything running without a hitch.

Description of the initiative:
The “barometer for measuring the feeling of insecurity and the vigilance of customers and non-customers on SNCF premises” is to qualitatively measure customer feelings and to come up with new paths of discussion and action. Two online quantitative surveys were carried out in 2008 and 2010. Respondents were recruited via an Internet forum (customers and non-customers), it takes about 10 minutes to go through the whole questionnaire. Questions relate to what types of train are chosen, how often they are used, whether travellers feel unsafe in stations and trains, the social perception of the risk of being a victim, the social perception of the risk of a serious incident occurring, vigilance and avoidance behaviour, and the degree of insecurity in different situations.

Implementation in the company:
Since 1998 the database CEZAR (Connaître l’Evolution des Zones à Risque) is updated on a daily basis by security staff. In addition, SNCF also has an internal network consisting of: security experts, whether at central, regional or local level. Security is the lowest common denominator of the company’s different divisions. In the knowledge that just one statistic on acts of delinquency (measuring the number of infringements) only provides a very incomplete picture and highlights just a small part of the daily reality experienced by travellers, the Security Observatory, in partnership with the operators, launched an opinion survey (the ‘barometer’) in 2008 aimed at measuring the customers’ and non-customers’ feeling of insecurity.

Success factors – results – evaluation:
SNCF has managed to come up with a number of very basic findings for use in understanding the social roots of this whole phenomenon, the way it is seen by customers and non-customers (which greatly differs from that of the experts). Here are a few examples:

- The feeling of insecurity is greater inside a station than on board a train.
- Though not feeling insecure, many customers were vigilant.
- Customers perceive risks for the most without thinking about their physical effect, whereas non-customers tend to think that incidents occur much more frequently.
- More or less disturbing situations provoking different degrees of insecurity feelings: signs of abandonment or proper upkeep (the state of cleanliness, smells, lighting, the condition of station and train facilities); journey context (alone in a carriage, evening travel, the presence of undesirable people, the presence of security staff, CCTV, etc.)

These results show in particular the lack of any direct link between delinquency and the feeling of insecurity. They similarly demonstrate that conventional security strategies in this type of public transport need to be reconsidered. Current measures for fighting delinquency are frequently unsuited for reducing the feeling of insecurity.

The results of this opinion survey allow an approach of the feeling of insecurity from an angle of confidence and trust and question different SNCF functions, but also institutional partners.

Contact Person:
Michèle Fort
SNCF
e-mail: michele.fort@sncf.fr
Winnie Rochaix
SNCF
e-mail: winnie.rochaix@sncf.fr
### 1. Organisation, leadership and responsibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Important aspects</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>What needs to be done?</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Looking at the area of responsibility of individual managers and the subject of risk assessment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>does it exist?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is it implemented?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is it regularly updated?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you know the company doctor and the specialist for occupational health &amp; safety?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Do you make use of these experts?”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have security officials been appointed for the respective areas of responsibility?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have these received training and are they in a position to carry out their responsibilities?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you regularly informed about the results of health &amp; safety committee meetings?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are sufficient numbers of colleagues trained in first-aid appointed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adequately trained?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have employees received such training?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are employees informed about the possibility of work-related medical check-ups?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are employees informed about the possibilities contained in the “Sicher unterwegs” agreement?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the relevant information posted on bulletin boards and regularly updated?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2. Instruction, on-the-job training, selection of training measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Important aspects</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>What needs to be done?</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has the employee been informed about how work is organised and what reporting structures exist?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does on-the-job training also cover health &amp; safety risks?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are new hires given details of important contact people?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are site tours conducted?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do regular (at least once a year) in-house training sessions take place?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are lists kept on who has taken part?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security training courses are planned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have been conducted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training course participants are selected on account of risk exposure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>routine work situations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personal suitability and willingness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The training is adequately tailored to the planned field of work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The training is effective in practice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training effectiveness is maintained, even when employees change jobs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The training does not increase the risk for participants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The measures can be implemented without interfering with routine operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The amount of time, money and personal commitment needing to be invested is clear and can be covered. The long-term effect is also clear.

Are the topics dealt with in the training sessions and courses put into practice?

### 3. Measures during and after aggressive incidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Important aspects</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>What needs to be done?</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does risk assessment take account of specific factors (e.g. where and at what time incidents occur, organisational factors)?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has there been a check on whether devices deterring possibly violent people (beepers, emergency mobile phones, etc.) can be of help in certain situations?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there preventive measures available helping employees to avoid or master violent situations?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are employees informed on how they should behave when assaulted?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you inform employees about what to do in an emergency?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do employees know the reporting system and who to report to?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do employees know the company “Sicher unterwegs“ guidelines?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are internal and external health &amp; safety bodies consulted? Is there any cooperation with them?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the case of an assault, is initial care ensured?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the victim given immediate psychological and/or medical support?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the victim supported in possible administrative and legal proceedings?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do managers sympathise with / support victims?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the wake of an incident, is the risk assessment reviewed? When necessary, are additional measures introduced?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are other employees informed about the incident in an appropriate manner?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is an incident report filled out after each incident (documentation)?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## “SICHER UNTERWEGS” – INCIDENT REPORT

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Victim’s name:</td>
<td>Occupation:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Victim’s address</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Tel. private:</td>
<td>Tel. at work:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Company/location:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Department:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Victim’s SocSec number / recipient number:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Date of the incident:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Time of the incident:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Place of the incident:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Workplace (if different):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Type of incident (please check):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assault [ ] Harassment [ ] Damage to property [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Were you injured?</td>
<td>Yes [x] No [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If yes, please describe your injuries and where you went for treatment:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Was the police called?</td>
<td>Yes [x] No [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Which police station?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Was a police report compiled?</td>
<td>Yes [x] No [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of report (if known):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Was your direct superior informed?</td>
<td>Yes [x] No [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Name of your direct superior:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Which measures were taken by the company? (please check):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charges filed [ ] Customer banned [ ] Support offered [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other employees informed of the incident [ ] None [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Offender (please check):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Customer [ ] Visitor [ ] Intruder [ ] Colleague [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other (please specify):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Name, address and age of the offender (if known):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Please describe the incident:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. What measures were taken after the incident with regard to the offender? (please check):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrest [x] No arrest [ ] Warning [ ] Ban [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reprimand [ ] Other:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Was a weapon used during the incident?</td>
<td>Yes [ ] No [x]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If yes, what sort?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Did the incident result in you being off sick?</td>
<td>Yes [ ] No [x]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If yes, for how long?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Was the violence also directed against others (i.e. you were not the only person assaulted)?</td>
<td>Yes [ ] No [x]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If yes, please state who else was involved:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Were you alone when the incident occurred?</td>
<td>Yes [x] No [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. In your opinion, where there any specific circumstances causing the incident?</td>
<td>Yes [ ] No [x]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Which circumstances?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Have you or other colleagues previously been victims of this type of incident?</td>
<td>Yes [x] No [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If yes, please provide further details:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Have you received any form of counselling or support since the assault?</td>
<td>Yes [x] No [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If yes, please provide further details:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. What in your opinion can be done to prevent such incidents happening in the future?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Was this the offender’s first-time offence?</td>
<td>Yes [x] No [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Are there any measures that could prevent such incidents?</td>
<td>Yes [ ] No [x]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If yes, please provide further details:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Have corrective measures been taken?</td>
<td>Yes [x] No [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If yes, please provide further details:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Have you heard about the EVG’s “Sicher unterwegs” campaign?</td>
<td>Yes [x] No [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Comments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Contact details Project Steering Committee

**CER**

Jean-Paul Preumont  
Avenue des Arts, 53  
1000 Brussels  
Belgium  
Telephone: +32 2 5252521  
e-mail: jean-paul.preumont@cer.be

**Corporate Security Service SNCB-Holding**

Hannelore Van Hulle  
Rue de France 52–54  
1060 Brussels  
Belgium  
Telephone: +32 2 5259325  
e-mail: hannelore.vanhulle@b-holding.be

**BDZ – Passengers EOOD**

Daniel Kanev  
3 Ivan Vasov Street  
1080 Sofia  
Bulgaria  
Telephone: +359 2 9811110  
e-mail: dkanev@bdz.bg

**Société nationale des chemins de fer Français (SNCF)**

Barbara Grau  
34 rue du Commandant Mouchotte  
75699 Paris Cedex 14  
France  
Telephone: +33 1 53253180  
e-mail: barbaragrau@snfc.fr

**Deutsche Bahn AG**

Anja Boecker  
Potsdamer Platz 2  
10785 Berlin  
Germany  
Telephone: +49 30 29761067  
e-mail: anja.boecker@deutschebahn.com

**Rete Ferroviaria Italiana S.p.A.**

Maria Cristina Fiorentino  
Piazza della Croce Rossa 1  
00161 Roma  
Italy  
Telephone: +39 06 44102580  
e-mail: ma.fiorentino@rfi.it

**ETF**

**Federation of Transport Trade Unions in Bulgaria (FTTUB)**  
Daniela Zlatkova  
106 Mariya Luiza blvd.  
Sofia 1233  
Bulgaria  
Telephone: +35 929318001  
e-mail: d.zlatkova@stsb.bg

**Secteur cheminots de la centrale générale des services publics - ACOD-CGSP**  
Rudy Verleysen  
Fontainasplein 9–11  
1000 Bruxelles  
Belgium  
Telephone: +32 479 862556  
e-mail: rudy.verleysen@acod-spool.be

**Eisenbahn- und Verkehrsgewerkschaft (EVG)**  
European Works Council DB AG  
Michael Bartl  
Bellevuestraße 3  
10785 Berlin  
Germany  
Telephone: +49 30 29754043  
e-mail: michael.bartl@deutschebahn.com

**Fédération Générale des Transports et de l’Equipment CFDT – Union Fédérale des Cheminots et Activités Complémentaires (FGTE- CFDT UFCAC )**  
Rémi Aufrère  
47 avenue Simon Bolivar  
75019 Paris  
France  
Telephone: +33 1 56415606  
e-mail: aufrere@fgte-cfdt.org

**Vasúti Dolgozók Szabad Szakszervezete (VDSZSZ)**  
Katalin Mathe  
International Officer  
Ajtosi Durer sor 27a  
1146 Budapest  
Hungary  
Telephone: +36 703606653  
e-mail: mathe.katalin@vdszsz.hu

**vida**  
Gerhard Tauchner  
Büro des Zentralbetriebsrats  
Johann-Böhms-Platz 1  
1020 Wien  
Austria  
Telephone: +43 1 5344479601  
e-mail: gerhard.tauchner@vida.at